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Abstract
A (K,N, T,Kc) instance of the MDS-TPIR problem is comprised of K messages and N
distributed servers. Each message is separately encoded through a (Kc, N) MDS storage code.
A user wishes to retrieve one message, as efficiently as possible, while revealing no information
about the desired message index to any colluding set of up to T servers. The fundamental limit
on the efficiency of retrieval, i.e., the capacity of MDS-TPIR is known only at the extremes
where either T or Kc belongs to {1, N}. The focus of this work is a recent conjecture by
Freij-Hollanti, Gnilke, Hollanti and Karpuk which offers a general capacity expression for MDS-
TPIR. We prove that the conjecture is false by presenting as a counterexample a PIR scheme for
the setting (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 2, 2), which achieves the rate 3/5, exceeding the conjectured
capacity, 4/7. Insights from the counterexample lead us to capacity characterizations for various
instances of MDS-TPIR including all cases with (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, N, T,N − 1), where N and
T can be arbitrary.
Hua Sun (email: huas2@uci.edu) and Syed A. Jafar (email: syed@uci.edu) are with the Center of Pervasive
Communications and Computing (CPCC) in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS)
at the University of California Irvine.
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1 Introduction
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) is the problem of retrieving one out of K messages from N
distributed servers (each stores all K messages) in such a way that any individual server learns no
information about which message is being retrieved. The rate of a PIR scheme is the ratio of the
number of bits of the desired message to the total number of bits downloaded from all servers. The
supremum of achievable rates is the capacity of PIR. The capacity of PIR was shown in [1] to be
CPIR =
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)−1
(1)
The capacity of several variants of PIR has also since been characterized in [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
The focus of this work is on a recent conjecture by Freij-Hollanti, Gnilke, Hollanti and Karpuk
(FGHK conjecture, in short) in [6] which offers a capacity expression for a generalized form of PIR,
called MDS-TPIR. MDS-TPIR involves two additional parameters: Kc and T , which generalize
the storage and privacy constraints, respectively. Instead of replication, each message is encoded
through a (Kc, N) MDS storage code, so that the information stored at any Kc servers is exactly
enough to recover all K messages. Privacy must be preserved not just from each individual server,
but from any colluding set of up to T servers. MDS-TPIR is a generalization of PIR, because
setting both T = 1 and Kc = 1 reduces MDS-TPIR to the original PIR problem for which the
capacity is already known (see (1)).
The capacity of MDS-TPIR is known only at the degenerate extremes – when either T or Kc
takes the value 1 or N . If either T or Kc is equal to N then by analogy to the single server setting it
follows immediately that the user must download all messages, i.e., the capacity is 1/K. If Kc = 1
or T = 1, then the problem specializes to TPIR, and MDS-PIR, respectively. The capacity of TPIR
(Kc = 1) was shown in [2] to be
CTPIR =
(
1 +
T
N
+
T 2
N2
+ · · ·+
TK−1
NK−1
)−1
(2)
The capacity of MDS-PIR (T = 1) was characterized by Banawan and Ulukus in [5], as
CMDS-PIR =
(
1 +
Kc
N
+
K2c
N2
+ · · ·+
KK−1c
NK−1
)−1
(3)
It is notable that Kc and T play similar roles in the two capacity expressions.
The capacity achieving scheme of Banawan and Ulukus [5] improved upon a scheme proposed
earlier by Tajeddine and Rouayheb in [7]. Tajeddine and Rouayheb also proposed an achievable
scheme for MDS-TPIR for the T = 2 setting. The scheme was generalized by Freij-Hollanti et al.
[6] to the (K,N, T,Kc) setting, T +Kc ≤ N , where it achieves the rate 1−
T+Kc−1
N . Remarkably,
the rate achieved by this scheme does not depend on the number of messages, K. In support of
the plausible asymptotic (K → ∞) optimality of their scheme, and based on the intuition from
existing capacity expressions for PIR, MDS-PIR and TPIR, Freij-Hollanti et al. conjecture that if
T +Kc ≤ N , then the capacity of MDS-TPIR is given by the following expression.
FGHK Conjecture [6]:
CconjMDS-TPIR =
(
1 +
T +Kc − 1
N
+ · · · +
(T +Kc − 1)
K−1
NK−1
)−1
(4)
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The conjecture is appealing for its generality and elegance as it captures all four parameters,
K,N, T,Kc in a compact form. T and Kc appear as interchangeable terms, and the capacity
expression appears to be a natural extension of the capacity expressions for TPIR and MDS-PIR.
Indeed, the conjectured capacity recovers the known capacity of TPIR if we set Kc = 1 and that of
MDS-PIR if we set T = 1. However, in all non-degenerate cases where T,Kc /∈ {1, N}, the capacity
of MDS-TPIR, and therefore the validity of the conjecture is unknown. In fact, in all these cases
the problem is open on both sides, i.e., the conjectured capacity expression is neither known to be
achievable, nor known to be an outer bound. The lack of any non-trivial outer bounds for MDS-
TPIR is also recently highlighted in [8]. This intriguing combination of plausibility, uncertainty
and generality of the FGHK conjecture motivates our work. Our contribution is summarized next.
Summary of Contribution
As the main outcome of this work, we disprove the FGHK conjecture. For our counterexample, we
consider the setting (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 2, 2) where the data is stored using the (2, 4) MDS code
(x, y) → (x, y, x + y, x + 2y). The conjectured capacity for this setting is 4/7. We show that the
rate 3/5 > 4/7 is achievable, thus disproving the conjecture. As a converse argument, we show that
no (scalar or vector) linear PIR scheme can achieve a rate higher than 3/5 for this MDS storage
code subject to T = 2 privacy.
The insights from the counterexample lead us to characterize the exact capacity of various
instances of MDS-TPIR. This includes all cases with (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, N, T,N −1), where N and
T can be arbitrary. The capacity for these cases turns out to be
C =
N2 −N
2N2 − 3N + T
(5)
Note that this is the information theoretic capacity, i.e., for K = 2 messages, no (N − 1, N) MDS
storage code and no PIR scheme (linear or non-linear) can beat this rate, which is achievable with
the simple MDS storage code (x1, x2, · · · , xN−1) → (x1, x2, · · · , xN−1,
∑N−1
i=1 xi) and a linear PIR
scheme.
The general capacity expression for MDS-TPIR remains unknown. However, we are able to
show that it cannot be symmetric in Kc and T , i.e., the two parameters are not interchangeable in
general. Also, between Kc and T the capacity expression does not consistently favor one over the
other. These findings are illustrated by the following four cases for which the capacity is settled.
(K,N, T,Kc)
(2, 4, 2, 3) (2, 4, 3, 2) (2, 4, 1, 3) (2, 4, 3, 1)
Capacity 6/11 4/7 4/7 4/7
Ref. Theorem 3 Section 7.1.2 [5] [2]
The first two columns show that the capacity is not symmetric in Kc and T , since switching their
values changes the capacity. The first two columns also suggest that increasing Kc hurts capacity
more than increasing T . However, considering columns 3 and 4 as the baseline where the capacities
are equal, and comparing the drop in capacity from column 3 to column 1 when T is increased,
versus no change in capacity from column 4 to column 2 when Kc is increased shows the opposite
trend. Therefore, neither T nor Kc is consistently dominant in terms of the sensitivity of capacity
to these two parameters.
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Finally, taking an asymptotic view of capacity of MDS-TPIR, we show that if T + Kc > N ,
then the capacity collapses to 0 as the number of messages K → ∞. This is consistent with the
restriction of T +Kc ≤ N that is required by the achievable scheme of Freij-Hollanti et al. whose
rate does not depend on K.
Notation: For n1, n2 ∈ Z, define the notation [n1 : n2] as the set {n1, n1 + 1, · · · , n2}, An1:n2
as the vector (An1 , An1+1, · · · , An2), and S(n1 : n2, :) as the submatrix of a matrix S formed by
retaining only the nth1 to the n
th
2 rows. The notation X ∼ Y is used to indicate that X and Y are
identically distributed. The cardinality of a set I is denoted as |I|. The determinant of a matrix
S is denoted as |S|. For an index set I = {i1, · · · , in} such that i1 < · · · < in, the notation AI
represents the vector (Ai1 , · · · , Ain). (V1;V2; · · · ;Vn) refers to a matrix whose i
th row vector is
Vi, i ∈ [1 : n].
2 Problem Statement
Consider1 K independent messages W1, · · · ,WK ∈ F
L×1
p , each represented as an L × 1 vector
comprised of L i.i.d. uniform symbols from a finite field Fp for a prime p. In p-ary units,
H(W1) = · · · = H(WK) = L (6)
H(W1, · · · ,WK) = H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK) (7)
There are N servers. The nth server stores (W1n,W2n, · · · ,WKn), where Wkn ∈ F
L
Kc
×1 represents
L/Kc symbols from Wk, k ∈ [1 : K].
H(Wkn|Wk) = 0, H(Wkn) = L/Kc (8)
We require the storage system to satisfy the MDS property, i.e., from the information stored in any
Kc servers, we can recover each message, i.e.,
[MDS] H(Wk|WkKc) = 0,∀Kc ⊂ [1 : N ], |Kc| = Kc (9)
Let us use F to denote a random variable privately generated by the user, whose realization is
not available to the servers. F represents the randomness in the strategies followed by the user.
Similarly, G is a random variable that determines the random strategies followed by the servers, and
whose realizations are assumed to be known to all the servers and to the user. The user privately
generates θ uniformly from [1 : K] and wishes to retrieve Wθ while keeping θ a secret from each
server. F and G are generated independently and before the realizations of the messages or the
desired message index are known, so that
H(θ,F ,G,W1, · · · ,WK) = H(θ) +H(F) +H(G) +H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK) (10)
Suppose θ = k. In order to retrieve Wk, k ∈ [1 : K] privately, the user privately generates N
random queries, Q
[k]
1 , · · · , Q
[k]
N .
H(Q
[k]
1 , · · · , Q
[k]
N |F) = 0,∀k ∈ [1 : K] (11)
1While the problem statement is presented in its general form, we will primarily consider cases with K = 2
messages in this paper (outer bounds for larger K are presented in Section 7.4).
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The user sends query Q
[k]
n to the nth server, n ∈ [1 : N ]. Upon receiving Q
[k]
n , the nth server
generates an answering string A
[k]
n , which is a function of the received query Q
[k]
n , the stored
information W1n, · · · ,WKn and G,
H(A[k]n |Q
[k]
n ,W1n, · · · ,WKn,G) = 0 (12)
Each server returns to the user its answer A
[k]
n .2
From all the information that is now available at the user (A
[k]
1:N , Q
[k]
1:N ,F ,G), the user decodes
the desired message Wk according to a decoding rule that is specified by the PIR scheme. Let Pe
denote the probability of error achieved with the specified decoding rule.
To protect the user’s privacy, theK strategies must be indistinguishable (identically distributed)
from the perspective of any subset T ⊂ [1 : N ] of at most T colluding servers, i.e., the following
privacy constraint must be satisfied.
[T -Privacy] (Q
[k]
T , A
[k]
T ,G,W1T , · · · ,WKT ) ∼ (Q
[k′]
T , A
[k′]
T ,G,W1T , · · · ,WKT ),
∀k, k′ ∈ [1 : K],∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T (13)
The PIR rate characterizes how many bits of desired information are retrieved per downloaded
bit and is defined as follows.
R = L/D (14)
where D is the expected value of the total number of bits downloaded by the user from all the
servers.
A rate R is said to be ǫ-error achievable if there exists a sequence of PIR schemes, indexed by
L, each of rate greater than or equal to R, for which Pe → 0 as L → ∞. Note that for such a
sequence of PIR schemes, from Fano’s inequality, we must have
[Correctness] o(L) =
1
L
H(Wk|A
[k]
1:N , Q
[k]
1:N ,F ,G) (15)
(11)
=
1
L
H(Wk|A
[k]
1:N ,F ,G) (16)
where o(L) represents a term whose value approaches zero as L approaches infinity. The supremum
of ǫ-error achievable rates is called the capacity C.3
3 Settling the Conjecture
Our main result, which settles the FGHK conjecture, is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For the MDS-TPIR problem with K = 2 messages, N = 4 servers, T = 2 privacy and
the (Kc, N) = (2, 4) MDS storage code (x, y)→ (x, y, x+y, x+2y), a rate of 3/5 is achievable. Since
the achievable rate exceeds the conjectured capacity of 4/7 for this setting, the FGHK conjecture is
false.
2If the A
[k]
n are obtained as inner products of query vectors and stored message vectors, then such a PIR scheme
is called a linear PIR scheme.
3Alternatively, the capacity may be defined with respect to zero error criterion, i.e., the supreme of zero error
achievable rates where a rate R is said to be zero error achievable if there exists (for some L) a PIR scheme of rate
greater than or equal to R for which Pe = 0.
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Proof: We present a scheme that achieves rate 3/5. We assume that each message is comprised
of L = 12 symbols from Fp for a sufficiently
4 large prime p. Define a ∈ F6×1p as the 6 × 1 vector
(a1; a2; · · · ; a6) comprised of i.i.d. uniform symbols ai ∈ Fp. Vectors b, c,d are defined similarly.
Messages W1,W2 are defined in terms of these vectors as follows.
W1 = (a;b) W2 = (c;d) (17)
3.1 Storage Code
The storage is specified as
(W11,W12,W13,W14) = (a,b,a+ b,a+ 2b) (18)
(W21,W22,W23,W24) = (c,d, c + d, c+ 2d) (19)
Recall that Wkn is the information about message Wk that is stored at Server n. Thus, Server 1
stores (a, c), Server 2 stores (b,d), Server 3 stores (a+ b, c+ d), and Server 4 stores (a+ 2b, c + 2d).
In particular, each server stores 6 symbols for each message, for a total of 12 symbols per server.
Any two servers store just enough information to recover both messages, thus the MDS storage
criterion is satisfied.
3.2 Construction of Queries
The query to each server Q
[k]
n is comprised of two parts, denoted as Q
[k]
n (W1), Q
[k]
n (W2). Each
part contains 3 row vectors, also called query vectors, along which the server should project its
corresponding stored message symbols.
Q[k]n = (Q
[k]
n (W1), Q
[k]
n (W2)) (20)
In preparation for the construction of the queries, let us denote the set of all full rank 6×6 matrices
over Fp as S. The user privately chooses two matrices, S and S
′, independently and uniformly from
S. Label the rows of S as V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, and the rows of S
′ as U0, U1, U2, U3, U4, U5. Define
V1 = {V1, V2, V3}, U1 = {U0, U6, U8} (21)
V2 = {V1, V4, V5}, U2 = {U0, U7, U9} (22)
V3 = {V2, V4, V6}, U3 = {U0, U1, U3} (23)
V4 = {V3, V5, V6}, U4 = {U0, U2, U4} (24)
U6, U7, U8, U9 are obtained as follows.
U6 = U1 + U2, U7 = U1 + 2U2 (25)
U8 = U3 + U4, U9 = U3 + 2U4 (26)
As a preview of what we are trying to accomplish, we note that for Server n ∈ [1 : 4], Vn will
be used as the query vectors for desired message symbols, while Un will be used as query vectors
4It suffices to choose p = 349 for Theorem 1. In general, the appeal to large field size, analogous to the random
coding argument in information theory, is made to prove the existence of a scheme, but may not be essential to the
construction of the PIR scheme. To underscore this point, Section 7.1 includes some examples of MDS-TPIR capacity
achieving schemes over small fields.
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for undesired message symbols. Since Kc = 2, the same query vector Vi sent to two different
servers will recover 2 independent desired symbols. Each Vi, i ∈ [1 : 6], is used exactly twice, so
all queries for desired symbols will return independent information for a total of 12 independent
desired symbols. On the other hand, for undesired symbols note that U0 is used as the query
vector to all 4 servers, but because Kc = 2, it can only produce 2 independent symbols, i.e., 2 of
the 4 symbols are redundant. The dependencies introduced via (25),(26) are carefully chosen to
ensure that the queries along U1, U2, U6, U7 will produce only 3 independent symbols. Similarly,
the queries along U3, U4, U8, U9 will produce only 3 independent symbols. Thus, all the queries for
the undesired message will produce a total of only 8 independent symbols. The 12 independent
desired symbols and 8 independent undesired symbols will be resolved from a total of 12 + 8 = 20
downloaded symbols, to achieve the rate 12/20 = 3/5. To ensure T = 2 privacy, the Ui and Vi
queries will be made indistinguishable from the perspective of any 2 colluding servers. The key to
the T = 2 privacy is that any Vn,Vn′ , n 6= n
′ have one element in common. Similarly, any Un,Un′ ,
n 6= n′ also have one element in common. This is a critical aspect of the construction.
Next we provide a detailed description of the queries and downloads for message Wk, k ∈ [1 : 2],
both when Wk is desired and when it is not desired. To simplify the notation, we will denote
Wk = (x;y). Note that when k = 1, (x;y) = (a;b) and when k = 2, (x;y) = (c;d).
3.2.1 Case 1. Wk is Desired
The query sent to Server n is a 3 × 6 matrix whose rows are the 3 vectors in Vn. The ordering of
the rows is uniformly random, i.e.,
Server n : Q[k]n (Wk) = πn(Vn), n ∈ [1 : 4] (27)
For a set V = {Vi1 , Vi2 , Vi3}, πn(V) is equally likely to return any one of the 6 possibilities:
(Vi1 ;Vi2 ;Vi3), (Vi1 ;Vi3 ;Vi2), (Vi2 ;Vi1 ;Vi3), (Vi2 ;Vi3 ;Vi1), (Vi3 ;Vi1 ;Vi2) and (Vi3 ;Vi2 ;Vi1). The πn
are independently chosen for each n ∈ [1 : 4].
After receiving the 3 query vectors Q
[k]
n (Wk), Server n projects its stored Wkn symbols along
these vectors. This creates three linear combinations of Wkn symbols (denoted as A
[k]
n (Wk)).
A[k]n (Wk) = Q
[k]
n (Wk)Wkn (28)
Define kc = 3 − k as the complement of k, i.e., kc = 1 if k = 2 and vice versa. The answers A
[k]
n
to be sent to the user will be constructed eventually by combining A
[k]
n (Wk) and A
[k]
n (Wkc), since
separately sending these answers will be too inefficient. The details of this combining process will
be specified later. Next we note an important property of the construction.
Desired Symbols Are Independent: We show that if the user can recover A
[k]
1:4(Wk) from the
downloads, then he can recover all 12 symbols of Wk. From A
[k]
1:4(Wk) the user recovers the 12
symbols V1x, V2x, V3x, V1y, V4y, V5y, V2(x+ y), V4(x+ y), V6(x+ y), V3(x+ 2y), V5(x+ 2y),
V6(x+ 2y). From these 12 symbols, he recovers Vix and Viy for all i ∈ [1 : 6]. Since S =
(V1;V2;V3;V4;V5;V6) has full rank (invertible) and the user knows V1:6, he recovers all symbols in
x and y (thus Wk).
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3.2.2 Case 2. Wk is Undesired
Similarly, the query sent to Server n is a 3 × 6 matrix whose rows are the 3 vectors in Un. The
ordering of the rows is uniformly random for each n, and independent across all n ∈ [1 : 4].
Server n : Q[k
c]
n (Wk) = π
′
n(Un), n ∈ [1 : 4] (29)
Each server projects its stored Wkn symbols along the 3 query vectors to obtain,
A[k
c]
n (Wk) = Q
[kc]
n (Wk)Wkn (30)
Interfering Symbols Have Dimension 8: A
[kc]
1:4 (Wk) is comprised of U0x, U6x, U8x, U0y, U7y, U9y,
U0(x+ y), U1(x+ y), U3(x+ y), U0(x+ 2y), U2(x+ 2y), U4(x+ 2y). We now show that these
12 symbols are dependent and have dimension only 8.5 Because of (25) and (26), we have
U0x+ U0y = U0(x+ y)
U0x+ 2U0y = U0(x+ 2y)
U6x+ U7y− U1(x+ y) = U2(x+ 2y)
U8x+ U9y− U3(x+ y) = U4(x+ 2y) (31)
Thus, of the 12 symbols recovered from A
[kc]
1:4 (Wk), at least 4 are linear combinations of the remaining
8. It follows that A
[kc]
1:4 (Wk) contains no more than 8 dimensions. The number of dimensions is
also not less than 8 because, the following 8 undesired symbols (two symbols from each server) are
independent,
Server 1 : U0x, U6x = (U1 + U2)x
Server 2 : U0y, U9y = (U3 + 2U4)y
Server 3 : U1(x+ y), U3(x+ y)
Server 4 : U2(x+ 2y), U4(x+ 2y) (32)
To see that the 8 symbols are independent, we add 4 new symbols (U1x, U3y, U5x, U5y) such
that from the 12 symbols, we can recover all 12 undesired symbols (S′x, S′y). Since the 4 new
symbols cannot contribute more than 4 dimensions, the original 8 symbols must occupy at least 8
dimensions.
3.3 Combining Answers for Efficient Download
Based on the queries, each server has 3 linear combinations of symbols of W1 in A
[k]
n (W1) and 3
linear combinations of symbols of W2 in A
[k]
n (W2) for a total of 12 linear combinations of desired
symbols and 12 linear combinations of undesired symbols across all servers. However, recall that
there are only 8 independent linear combinations of undesired symbols. This is a fact that can be
exploited to improve the efficiency of download. Specifically, we will combine the 6 queried symbols
(i.e., the 6 linear combinations) from each server into 5 symbols to be downloaded by the user.
Intuitively, 5 symbols from each server will give the user a total of 20 symbols, from which he can
resolve the 12 desired and 8 undesired symbols.
5Equivalently, the joint entropy of these 12 variables, conditioned on U0:9 is only 8 p-ary units.
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The following function maps 6 queried symbols to 5 downloaded symbols.
L(X1,X2,X3, Y1, Y2, Y3) = (X1,X2, Y1, Y2,X3 + Y3) (33)
Note that the first four symbols are directly downloaded and only the last symbol is mixed. The
desired and undesired symbols are combined to produce the answers as follows.
A[k]n = L(CnA
[k]
n (W1), CnA
[k]
n (W2)) (34)
where Cn are deterministic 3×3 matrices, that are required to satisfy the following two properties.
Denote the first 2 rows of Cn as Cn.
P1. All Cn must have full rank.
P2. For all (3!)4 distinct realizations of π′n, n ∈ [1 : 4], the 8 linear combinations of the un-
desired message symbols that are directly downloaded (2 from each server), C1A
[k]
1 (Wkc),
C2A
[k]
2 (Wkc), C3A
[k]
3 (Wkc), C4A
[k]
4 (Wkc) are independent.
As we will prove in the sequel, it is not difficult to find matrices that satisfy these properties.
In fact, these properties are ‘generic’, i.e., uniformly random choices of Cn matrices will satisfy
these properties with probability approaching 1 as the field size approaches infinity. The appeal
to generic property will be particularly useful as we consider larger classes of MDS-TPIR settings.
Those (weaker) proofs apply here as well. However, for the particular setting of Theorem 1, based
on a brute force search we are able to strengthen the proof by presenting the following explicit
choice of Cn, n ∈ [1 : 4] which satisfies both properties over F349.
C1 =
 1 2 36 5 4
0 0 1
 , C2 =
 1 7 311 9 8
0 0 1
 , C3 =
 1 10 87 5 4
0 0 1
 , C4 =
 1 3 512 9 3
0 0 1
 (35)
Property P1 is trivially verified. Property P2 is verified by considering one by one, all of the 64
distinct realizations of π′n, n ∈ [1 : 4]. To show how this is done, let us consider one case here.
Suppose the realization of the permutations is such that
π′1(U1) = (U0, U6, U8) (36)
π′2(U2) = (U0, U9, U7) (37)
π′3(U3) = (U1, U3, U0) (38)
π′4(U4) = (U2, U4, U0) (39)
then we have
(C1A
[k]
1 (Wkc); · · · ;C4A
[k]
4 (Wkc)) =

1 2 0 −3 0 3 0 3
6 5 0 −4 0 4 0 4
0 −3 1 7 3 0 3 0
0 −8 11 9 8 0 8 0
8 0 8 0 1 10 0 0
4 0 4 0 7 5 0 0
5 0 10 0 0 0 1 3
3 0 6 0 0 0 12 9

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,C

U0x
U6x
U0y
U9y
U1(x+ y)
U3(x+ y)
U2(x+ 2y)
U4(x+ 2y)

(40)
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The determinant of C over F349 is 321. Since the determinant is non-zero, all of its 8 rows are
linearly independent. Note that the test for property P2 does not depend on the realizations of
Ui vectors. To see why this is true, note that the 8 linear combinations of (x,y) in the rightmost
column vector of (40) are linearly independent. Therefore, if C is an invertible matrix then the
8 directly downloaded linear combinations on the LHS of (40) are also independent (have joint
entropy 8 p-ary units, conditioned on U0:9).
At this point the construction of the scheme is complete. All that remains now is to prove that
the scheme is correct, i.e., it retrieves the desired message, and that it is T = 2 private.
3.4 The Scheme is Correct (Retrieves Desired Message)
As noted previously, the first 4 variables in the output of the L function are obtained directly,
i.e., C1A
[k]
1 (W1), C2A
[k]
2 (W1), C3A
[k]
3 (W1), C4A
[k]
4 (W1) and C1A
[k]
1 (W2), C2A
[k]
2 (W2), C3A
[k]
3 (W2),
C4A
[k]
4 (W2) are all directly recovered. By property P2 of Cn, C1A
[k]
1 (Wkc), C2A
[k]
2 (Wkc), C3A
[k]
3 (Wkc),
C4A
[k]
4 (Wkc) are linearly independent. Since the user has recovered 8 independent dimensions of
interference, and interference only spans 8 dimensions, all interference is recovered and eliminated.
Once the interference is eliminated, since Cn matrices have full rank, the user is left with 12 in-
dependent linear combinations of desired symbols, from which he is able to recover the 12 desired
message symbols. Therefore the scheme is correct.
3.5 The Scheme is Private (to any T = 2 Colluding Servers)
To prove that the scheme is T = 2 private (refer to (13)), it suffices to show that the queries for
any 2 servers are identically distributed, regardless of which message is desired. Since each query is
made up of two independently generated parts, one for each message, it suffices to prove that the
query vectors for a message (say Wk) are identically distributed, regardless of whether the message
is desired or undesired,(
Q[k]n1(Wk), Q
[k]
n2(Wk)
)
∼
(
Q[k
c]
n1 (Wk), Q
[kc]
n2 (Wk)
)
, ∀n1, n2 ∈ [1 : 4], n1 < n2 (41)
Note that (
Q[k]n1(Wk), Q
[k]
n2(Wk)
)
= (πn1(Vn1), πn2(Vn2)) (42)(
Q[k
c]
n1 (Wk), Q
[kc]
n2 (Wk)
)
=
(
π′n1(Un1), π
′
n2(Un2)
)
(43)
Therefore, to prove (41) it suffices to show the following.(
Vi1 , Vi2 , Vi3 , Vi4 , Vi5
)
∼
(
U0, Uj1 , Uj2 , Uj3 , Uj4
)
(44)
where Vn1 = {Vi1 , Vi2 , Vi3}, Vn2 = {Vi1 , Vi4 , Vi5}, Un1 = {U0, Uj1 , Uj2}, Un2 = {U0, Uj3 , Uj4}. Be-
cause S is uniformly chosen from the set of all full rank matrices, we have
(Vi1 , Vi2 , Vi3 , Vi4 , Vi5) ∼ (V1, V2, V3, V4, V5) (45)
Next we note that there is a bijection between
(U0, Uj1 , Uj2 , Uj3 , Uj4) ↔ (U0, U1, U2, U3, U4) (46)
10
This is because (U0, Uj1 , Uj2 , Uj3 , Uj4) always includes U0, two terms out of U1, U2, U6, U7 and
two terms out of U3, U4, U8, U9. But from any two terms of U1, U2, U6, U7 there is a bijection
to U1, U2, and from any two terms of U3, U4, U8, U9 there is a bijection to U3, U4. Now since
S′ = (U0;U1;U2;U3;U4;U5) is picked uniformly from S, conditioned on any feasible value of U5,
(U0, U1, U2, U3, U4) is uniformly distributed over all possible values that preserve full rank for S
′.
Since (U0, Uj1 , Uj2 , Uj3 , Uj4) spans the same space as (U0, U1, U2, U3, U4), they have the same set
of feasible values. The bijection between them then means that (U0, Uj1 , Uj2 , Uj3 , Uj4) is also uni-
formly distributed over all possibilities that preserve full rank for S′, conditioned on any feasible
U5. That means
(U0, Uj1 , Uj2 , Uj3 , Uj4) ∼ (U0, U1, U2, U3, U4) (47)
Finally, we note that S and S′ are identically distributed, so we have
(V1, V2, V3, V4, V5) ∼ (U0, U1, U2, U3, U4) (48)
Combining (45), (47) and (48), we arrive at (44) and (41).
3.6 Rate achieved is 3/5
The rate achieved is 12/20 = 3/5, because we download 20 symbols in total (5 from each server)
and the desired message size is 12 symbols.
4 Optimality of Rate 3/5
We presented a scheme that achieves the rate 3/5 for the setting (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 2, 2) with
the MDS storage code (x, y)→ (x, y, x+ y, x+2y). But is the scheme optimal? i.e., is the rate 3/5
the highest rate possible for this setting? To settle this question we need an upper bound. So far
the best information theoretic upper bound that we are able to prove is 8/136 (see Section 7.4.1),
which leaves the information theoretic capacity open for this setting. However, let us define the
notion of “linear capacity” as the highest rate that can be achieved by any (scalar or vector) linear
PIR scheme. It turns out that we are able to settle the linear capacity.
Theorem 2 For the MDS-TPIR problem with (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 2, 2) and the MDS storage
code (x, y)→ (x, y, x+ y, x+ 2y), the linear capacity is 3/5.
Proof: Since the achievability of 3/5 has already been shown, we are left to prove the converse, i.e.,
the upper bound.
Let a,b, c,d ∈ F
L/2×1
p be i.i.d. uniform L/2× 1 vectors over Fp. Without loss of generality, the
MDS storage code for message Wk is represented as follows.
W1 = (a;b) W2 = (c;d) (49)
and the storage is specified as
(W11,W12,W13,W14) = (a,b,a+ b,a+ 2b)
6Remarkably, 8/13 can be shown to be the capacity if the colluding sets of servers are restricted to servers
{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {4, 1} (see Section 7.5.1).
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(W21,W22,W23,W24) = (c,d, c + d, c+ 2d) (50)
The scheme is linear so that the download from each server consists of linear combinations of the
stored symbols of both messages. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we assume that the
scheme is symmetric7 and the download from each server is comprised of d ≤ L/2 independent
symbols from each message. Therefore, the downloads can be expressed as
A[k]n = V
[k]
1n W1n + V
[k]
2n W2n,∀n ∈ [1 : 4], k ∈ [1 : 2] (51)
rank(V
[k]
1n ) = rank(V
[k]
2n ) = d (52)
where V
[k]
in are D/4 × L/2 matrices that may be chosen randomly by the user (functions of F).
Clearly we must have 4d ≥ L otherwise the L symbols of the desired message cannot be recovered.
Define ǫ ≥ 0 such that
4d = L(1 + ǫ) (53)
Without loss of generality, let us assume henceforth that W2 is the desired message. For the next
set of arguments, we focus only on the downloads corresponding to W2, i.e., set all W1 symbols
to 0. Further, let us use the notation V to represent the row span of the matrix V . The symbols
downloaded from Server n along V ⊂ V
[2]
2n, are called redundant if they can be expressed as linear
combinations of symbols downloaded from other servers, i.e., they contribute no new information.
H(V W2n|V
[2]
2n1
W2n1 , V
[2]
2n2
W2n2 , V
[2]
2n3
W2n3 ,F , V ) = 0 (54)
where n, n1, n2, n3 are distinct indices in [1 : 4]. Note that we download no more than a total
of L(1 + ǫ) (possibly dependent) symbols of W2 from all 4 servers, from which we must be able
to decode all L independent symbols of W2. Therefore, we cannot have more than ǫL redundant
symbols. Therefore, for any V that satisfies (54) we must have
dim(V) ≤ ǫL (55)
Next, let us consider the pairwise overlap between V
[2]
2i and V
[2]
2j , i < j, i, j ∈ [1 : 4]. By the
symmetry of the scheme, there exist Vij , ∀i, j ∈ [1 : 4], i 6= j, and α ≥ 0 such that
Vij = V
[2]
2i ∩ V
[2]
2j , dim(Vij) = αd (56)
The following lemma formalizes the intuition that the overlaps α must be small enough to
ensure that we have enough independent symbols to recover W2.
Lemma 1
3αd ≤ d+ 2ǫL (57)
Equivalently, α ≤
1
3
+
8
3
(
ǫ
1 + ǫ
)
(58)
7Any scheme can be made symmetric, e.g., by repeating the original scheme for each of the N ! permutations of
the servers to retrieve a correspondingly expanded message of length L′ = N !L.
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Proof: First, we show that
dim(V12 ∩ V13) ≤ ǫL (59)
For any vector v ∈ V12 ∩ V13 (note that v belongs simultaneously to V
[2]
21 ,V
[2]
22 ,V
[2]
23), the symbol
vW23 (downloaded from Server 3) is redundant because it is a linear combination of downloads
from servers 1 and 2,
v(c+ d) = vc+ vd (60)
∴ vW23 = vW21 + vW22 (61)
⇒ H(vW23|V
[2]
21 W21, V
[2]
22 W22,F , v) = 0 (62)
From (62) and (55), we have (59).
Second, we show that
dim
(
(V12 ∪ V13
)
∩ V14) ≤ ǫL (63)
Consider any vector v ∈ V12. Because v belongs to both V
[2]
21 and V
[2]
22 , we have downloaded
vW21 = vc and vW22 = vd from servers 1 and 2. Similarly, for any vector v
′ ∈ V13, we have
downloaded v′W21 = v
′c and v′W23 = v
′(c+ d) = v′W21+v
′W22 (from servers 1 and 3), from which
we can recover v′W21 = v
′c and v′W22 = v
′d. Consider now any vector v∗ ∈ (V12 ∪ V13
)
∩ V14.
Suppose v∗ = h1v + h2v
′, v ∈ V12, v
′ ∈ V13 for constants h1, h2. The symbol v
∗W24 = v
∗(c+ 2d)
(downloaded from Server 4) is redundant because it is a linear combination of downloads from
servers 1, 2 and 3,
v∗W24 = (h1v + h2v
′)(c+ 2d) (64)
= h1vc+ 2h1vd+ h2v
′c+ 2h2v
′d (65)
= h1vW21 + 2h1vW22 + h2v
′W21 + 2h2v
′W22 (66)
⇒ H(v∗W24|V
[2]
21 W21, V
[2]
22 W22, V
[2]
23 W23,F , v
∗) = 0 (67)
From (67) and (55), we have (63). Next, consider dim(V12 ∪ V13).
dim(V12 ∪ V13) (68)
= dim(V12) + dim(V13)− dim(V12 ∩ V13) (69)
≥ 2αd − ǫL (from (56)(59)) (70)
Finally, consider dim(V12 ∪ V13 ∪ V14).
d = dim(V
[2]
21) ≥ dim(V12 ∪ V13 ∪ V14) (71)
= dim(V12 ∪ V13) + dim(V14)− dim
(
(V12 ∪ V13) ∩ V14
)
(72)
≥ 2αd − ǫL+ αd− ǫL (from (70)(56)(63)) (73)
⇒ 3αd ≤ d+ 2ǫL (74)
We now proceed to complete the converse.
D + o(L)L ≥ H(A
[1]
1:4|F ,G) + o(L)L (75)
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(16)
= H(A
[1]
1:4,W1|F ,G) (76)
(10)
= H(W1) +H(A
[1]
1 |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[1]
2:4|W1, A
[1]
1 F ,G) (77)
≥ H(W1) +H(A
[1]
1 |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[1]
3:4|W1,W21, A
[1]
1 ,F ,G) (78)
(8)(11)(12)
= H(W1) +H(A
[1]
1 |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[1]
3:4|W1,W21,F ,G) (79)
(8)(191)
= H(W1) +H(A
[2]
1 |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[2]
3:4|W1,W21,F ,G) (80)
(49)(50)
= H(a,b) +H(V
[2]
21 c|F) +H(V
[2]
23 (c+ d), V
[2]
24 (c+ 2d)|c,F) (81)
= H(a,b) +H(V
[2]
21 c|F) +H(V
[2]
23 d, 2V
[2]
24 d|F) (82)
(6)
= L+ dim(V
[2]
21) + dim(V
[2]
23 ∪ V
[2]
24) (83)
(52)(56)
= L+ d+ 2d− αd (84)
(58)
≥ L+
(
3−
1
3
−
8
3
(
ǫ
1 + ǫ
))
(1 + ǫ)L
4
(85)
= 5L/3 (86)
Letting L→∞, we have R = L/D ≤ 3/5.
5 Capacity of a Class of MDS-TPIR Instances
Building upon the insights from the achievable scheme and linear converse presented in the previous
sections, we are able to settle the information theoretic capacity of a non-trivial class of MDS-TPIR
instances.
Theorem 3 For the class of MDS-TPIR instances with (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, N, T,N − 1), with
arbitrary T,N , the capacity is C = N
2−N
2N2−3N+T .
The case T = N is trivial because if all servers collude then the situation is equivalent to the
single database scenario, i.e., it is optimal to download everything, and the capacity is 1/K = 1/2.
For the remaining cases, T < N , and the proof of converse is presented in Section 7.4.2. The proof
of achievability for T = 2 setting appears in Section 7.2 where we present a scheme with zero error.
The proof of achievability for T > 2 settings appears in Section 7.3 where we present a scheme
with vanishing probability of error. The remainder of this section presents two examples (one with
T = 2 and one with T = 3) to illustrate the key ideas.
5.1 Example: Capacity achieving scheme for (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 2, 3)
Let us present a scheme that achieves the rate 6/11, which is the capacity for this setting according
to Theorem 3. As evident from the description below, the scheme builds upon the ideas that were
introduced for Theorem 1.
5.1.1 Message and Storage Code
Let each message be comprised of L = N(N−1) = 12 independent symbols from a sufficiently large
finite field Fp. Define a ∈ F
4×1
p as the vector (a1; a2; a3; a4) comprised of i.i.d. uniform symbols
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ai ∈ Fp. Vectors b, c,d, e, f are defined similarly. Messages W1,W2 are defined in terms of these
vectors as follows.
W1 = (a;b; c) W2 = (d; e; f) (87)
The (N − 1, N) = (3, 4) MDS storage code is specified as follows.
(W11,W12,W13,W14) = (a,b, c,a + b+ c) (88)
(W21,W22,W23,W24) = (d, e, f ,d + e+ f) (89)
Note that each server stores 4 symbols for each message and any three serves store just enough
information to recover both messages (MDS property is satisfied).
5.1.2 Construction of Queries
The query to each server consists of 6 vectors, the first three for W1 (denoted as Q
[k]
n (W1)) and
the last three for W2 (denoted as Q
[k]
n (W2)). The queries and downloads for Wk, k ∈ [1 : 2] are
described next. We denote Wk = (x;y; z). When k = 1, (x;y; z) = (a;b; c) and when k = 2,
(x;y; z) = (d; e; f).
Denote the set of all full rank 4 × 4 matrices over Fp as S4. The user privately chooses two
matrices S, S′, independently and uniformly from S4. Label the rows of S as V1, V2, V3, V4, and the
rows of S′ as U1, U2, U1, U2. Define the following sets
V1 = { V2, V3, V4},
V2 = {V1, V3, V4},
V3 = {V1, V2, V4},
V4 = {V1, V2, V3 },
U1 = {U 1, U 2, U1}
U2 = {U 1, U 2, U2}
U3 = {U 1, U 2, U3}
U4 = {U 1, U 2, U4}
(90)
where U3, U4 are obtained as follows.
U3 = U1 + U2, (91)
U4 = U1 + 2U2 (92)
A preview of the scheme is as follows. For Server n ∈ [1 : 4], the vectors in Vn are for the desired
message and the vectors in Un are for the undesired message. Since Kc = N − 1 = 3, and each
query vector Vi is used no more than three times, all queries for the desired message will return
independent symbols for a total of 12 desired symbols. For the undesired message, the same query
vector U1 is used 4 times such that only 3 independent symbols are produced. Similarly the 4
uses of U2 produce only 3 independent symbols. Thus all queries for the undesired message will
produce at most 6 + 4 = 10 independent undesired symbols. The 12 independent desired symbols
and 10 undesired symbols will be resolved from a total of 12 + 10 = 22 downloaded symbols, to
achieve the rate 12/22 = 6/11. Privacy is ensured by the observation that any Vn,V
′
n, n 6= n
′ have
two elements in common and similarly any Un,U
′
n, n 6= n
′ have two elements in common. We now
proceed to the details.
When Wk is desired, we have ∀n ∈ [1 : 4],
Server n : Q[k]n (Wk) = πn(Vn), A
[k]
n (Wk) = Q
[k]
n (Wk)Wkn. (93)
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Desired Symbols Are Independent: From A
[k]
1:4(Wk), the user can recover the 12 symbols
V2x, V3x, V4x, V1y, V3y, V4y, V1z, V2z, V4z, V1(x+y+ z), V2(x+y+ z), V3(x+y+ z) and therefore
all 12 symbols (x;y; z) of Wk, since S = (V1;V2;V3;V4) has full rank.
When Wk is undesired, we have ∀n ∈ [1 : 4],
Server n : Q[k
c]
n (Wk) = π
′
n(Un), A
[kc]
n (Wk) = Q
[kc]
n (Wk)Wkn. (94)
Interfering Symbols Are Dependent and Have Dimension at most 10: Consider the interfering
symbols along the common vectors U1, U2. Note that
U1x+ U1y + U1z = U1(x+ y + z) (95)
U2x+ U2y + U2z = U2(x+ y + z) (96)
Since at least 2 interfering symbols are linear combinations of the rest, the 12 interfering symbols
cannot have more than 10 dimensions, i.e., their joint entropy is no more than 10 in p-ary units.
5.1.3 Combining Answers, Correctness and Rate
The combining process and correctness proof are similar to that in Theorem 1. The difference
is that in Theorem 1, we find the explicit choice of combining matrices, here we will only prove
the existence of combining matrices over a sufficiently large field. The details are deferred to the
general proof in Section 7.2. We repeat the above query construction two times independently such
that each server has 6 × 2 = 12 symbols (6 in W1 and 6 in W2). These 12 symbols at each server
are combined to 11 downloaded symbols, A
[k]
n and it is ensured that we can decode all interfering
symbols and then extract the desired symbols.
Thus, the rate achieved is 6/11.
5.1.4 Privacy Proof
The privacy proof is virtually identical to that in Theorem 1, so the details are deferred to the
general proof in Section 7.2.
5.2 Example: Capacity achieving scheme for (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 3, 3)
Let us present a scheme that achieves the rate 12/23, which is the capacity for this setting according
to Theorem 3. The key distinction of this T = 3 case with the T = 2 case presented in the previous
section is that permutations of the query vectors are no longer enough to ensure the privacy.
So we will resort to sending the space spanned by the query vectors instead of the query vectors
themselves. Furthermore, instead of guaranteeing zero-error, we will only show that the probability
of error can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a sufficiently large message size.
5.2.1 Message and Storage Code
The message construction and storage code are the same as when T = 2. Let each message be
comprised of L = N(N − 1) = 12 independent symbols from a sufficiently large finite field Fp.
Define a ∈ F4×1p as the vector (a1; a2; a3; a4) comprised of i.i.d. uniform symbols ai ∈ Fp. Vectors
b, c,d, e, f are defined similarly. Messages W1,W2 are defined in terms of these vectors as follows.
W1 = (a;b; c) W2 = (d; e; f) (97)
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The (N − 1, N) = (3, 4) MDS storage code is specified as follows.
(W11,W12,W13,W14) = (a,b, c,a + b+ c) (98)
(W21,W22,W23,W24) = (d, e, f ,d + e+ f) (99)
5.2.2 Construction of Queries
The query to each server consists of two vector spaces, one for W1 (span of the rows of Q
[k]
n (W1))
and one for W2 (span of the rows of Q
[k]
n (W2)). The queries and downloads for Wk, k ∈ [1 : 2]
are described next. We denote Wk = (x;y; z). When k = 1, (x;y; z) = (a;b; c) and when k = 2,
(x;y; z) = (d; e; f).
Denote the set of all full rank 4 × 4 matrices over Fp as S4. The user privately chooses two
matrices S, S′, independently and uniformly from S4. Label the rows of S as V1, V2, V3, V4, and the
rows of S′ as U1, U1, U2, U3. Define the following sets
V1 = { V2, V3, V4},
V2 = {V1, V3, V4},
V3 = {V1, V2, V4},
V4 = {V1, V2, V3 },
U1 = {U1, U˜1, U˜2} = {U 1, U1, U2}
U2 = {U1, U˜3, U˜4} = {U 1, U3, U1 + U2}
U3 = {U1, U˜5, U˜6} = {U 1, U1 + U3, U2 + U3}
U4 = {U1, U˜7, U˜8} = {U 1, U1 + U2 + U3, U1 + 2U2 + 2U3}
(100)
where U˜1, · · · , U˜8 are the rows of U˜ , obtained as follows.
U˜ = P (U1;U2;U3) (101)
i.e.,

U˜1
U˜2
U˜3
U˜4
U˜5
U˜6
U˜7
U˜8

=

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1
1 2 2

 U1U2
U3
 (102)
A preview of the scheme is as follows. For Server n ∈ [1 : 4], the span of Vn is the query space
for the desired message and the span of Un is the query space for the undesired message. Since
Kc = N − 1 = 3, and each query vector Vi is used no more than three times, all queries for the
desired message will return independent symbols for a total of 12 desired symbols. For the undesired
message, the same query vector U1 is used 4 times such that only 3 independent symbols will be
produced. Thus all queries for the undesired message will produce at most 3+ 8 = 11 independent
undesired symbols. The 12 independent desired symbols and 11 undesired symbols will be resolved
from a total of 12 + 11 = 23 downloaded symbols, to achieve the rate 12/23. Privacy is ensured
by choosing P in such a way that it allows a bijective mapping between the Un or Vn spaces that
may be observed by any set of up to T = 3 colluding servers. The bijection shows that the queries
for both desired and undesired messages are uniformly distributed, and therefore indistinguishable.
While a specific P is chosen for this example, there are many choices of P that will work. In fact,
P only needs to be sufficiently generic, so as the field size grows, almost all choices of P will work.
We now proceed to the details.
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When Wk is desired, we have ∀n ∈ [1 : 4],
Server n : Q[k]n (Wk) = B(Vn), A
[k]
n (Wk) = Q
[k]
n (Wk)Wkn. (103)
where B(V) represents the reduced row echelon form of a matrix whose rows are the elements of
V. The reduced row echelon form ensures that the queries reveal only the space spanned by the
corresponding Vi vectors to each server, and not directly the Vi vectors themselves.
Desired Symbols Are Independent: From A
[k]
1:4(Wk), we can recover the 12 symbols of Wk. Note
that because the user knows V1:4, from A
[k]
1:4(Wk) he can recover the projections along Vi. For
example, the row reduced echelon form for V1 is a change of basis operation that can be represented
as B(V1) = B1(V2;V3;V4) for some invertible matrix B1. Since the user knows B1, he can multiply
A
[k]
1 (Wk) with (B1)
−1 as follows
B−11 A
[k]
1 (Wk) = B
−1
1 Q
[k]
n (Wk)Wk1 (104)
= B−11 B1(V2;V3;V4)x (105)
= (V2x;V3x;V4x) (106)
Thus, fromA
[k]
1:4(Wk) the user recovers the 12 symbols V2x, V3x, V4x, V1y, V3y, V4y, V1z, V2z, V4z, V1(x+
y+z), V2(x+y+z), V3(x+y+z) and therefore all 12 symbols (x;y; z) ofWk, since S = (V1;V2;V3;V4)
has full rank.
When Wk is undesired, we have ∀n ∈ [1 : 4],
Server n : Q[k
c]
n (Wk) = B(Un), A
[kc]
n (Wk) = Q
[kc]
n (Wk)Wkn. (107)
Interfering Symbols Are Dependent and Have Dimension at most 11: Consider the interfering
symbols along the common vector U1. Note that
U1x+ U1y + U1z = U1(x+ y + z) (108)
Since at least 1 interfering symbol is a linear combination of the rest, the 12 interfering symbols
cannot have more than 11 dimensions, i.e., their joint entropy is no more than 11 in p-ary units.
5.2.3 Combining Answers, Correctness and Rate
The combining process and correctness proof are similar to that in Theorem 1 except that the
combining matrices Cn are chosen in a uniformly random manner now (so the matrices are no
longer deterministic). We will show in Section 7.3 that independent and uniformly random choices
of Cn are enough to guarantee that as the field size approaches infinity, i.e., p→∞, the probability
of error, Pe → 0. The reasoning for the rate calculation is as follows. We repeat the above query
construction four times independently such that each server has 6× 4 = 24 symbols (12 in W1 and
12 in W2). These 24 symbols at each server are combined to 23 downloaded symbols, A
[k]
n and it
is ensured that we can almost surely decode all interfering symbols and then extract the desired
symbols. Thus, the rate achieved is 12/23.
5.2.4 Privacy Proof
Since the privacy proof is a bit more involved now, let us use this example to introduce the key
ideas. To show that the scheme is private to any T = 3 colluding servers, it suffices to show that
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the queries for Wk for any T = 3 servers are identically distributed, regardless of which message is
desired. Consider 3 distinct indices i, j, l, i < j < l in [1 : 4], we require(
Q
[k]
i (Wk), Q
[k]
j (Wk), Q
[k]
l (Wk)
)
∼
(
Q
[kc]
i (Wk), Q
[kc]
j (Wk), Q
[kc]
l (Wk)
)
(109)
⇐⇒ (B(Vi),B(Vj),B(Vl)) ∼ (B(Ui),B(Uj),B(Ul)) (110)
Note that
(B(Vi),B(Vj),B(Vl)) = (B({Vm, Vj , Vl}),B({Vm, Vi, Vl}),B({Vm, Vi, Vj})) (111)
where m /∈ {i, j, l},m ∈ [1 : 4]. To prove (110), we wish to transform the spaces on the RHS to
the form that is the same as (111). To this end, we first compute the vectors that lie in the span
of both B(Ui) and B(Uj), i < j. Note that the matrix P is designed such that except U1, we have
only one such vector (up to scaling), denoted as U{i,j}. U{i,j} are computed explicitly as follows.
Further, we fix the scaling factor such that the U{i,j} vector is unique.
U{1,2} = U1 + U2 (112)
U{1,3} = U1 − U2 (113)
U{1,4} = U1 (114)
U{2,3} = U1 + U2 + 2U3 (115)
U{2,4} = U1 + U2 + U3 (116)
U{3,4} = U2 + U3 (117)
It is easy to verify that U{i,j}, U{i,l}, U{j,l}, i, j, l ∈ [1 : 4], i < j < l, are linearly independent, i.e.,
(i, j, l) = (1, 2, 3) rank(U{1,2};U{1,3};U{2,3}) = rank(U1 + U2;U1 − U2;U1 + U2 + 2U3) = 3
(i, j, l) = (1, 2, 4) rank(U{1,2};U{1,4};U{2,4}) = rank(U1 + U2;U1;U1 + U2 + U3) = 3
(i, j, l) = (1, 3, 4) rank(U{1,3};U{1,4};U{3,4}) = rank(U1 − U2;U1;U2 + U3) = 3
(i, j, l) = (2, 3, 4) rank(U{2,3};U{2,4};U{3,4}) = rank(U1 + U2 + 2U3;U1 + U2 + U3;U2 + U3) = 3
(118)
As a result, we may equivalently represent Q
[kc]
i (Wk) as
Q
[kc]
i (Wk) = B(Ui) = B({U 1, U{i,j}, U{i,l}}),∀i, j, l ∈ [1 : 4], i 6= j, i 6= l, j 6= l (119)
Note that equipped with this representation, (B(Ui),B(Uj),B(Ul)) is now of the same form as
(B(Vi),B(Vj),B(Vl)) and we are now ready to prove the privacy condition (110).
(110)⇐⇒ (B({Vm, Vj , Vl}),B({Vm, Vi, Vl}),B({Vm, Vi, Vj}))
∼
(
B({U1, U{i,j}, U{i,l}}),B({U 1, U{i,j}, U{j,l}}),B({U 1, U{i,l}, U{j,l}})
)
(120)
Therefore, it suffices to show the following.
(Vm, Vi, Vj , Vl) ∼ (U1, U{j,l}, U{i,l}, U{i,j}) (121)
Because S is uniformly chosen from the set of all full rank matrices, we have
(Vm, Vi, Vj , Vl) ∼ (V1, V2, V3, V4) (122)
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Based on (118), there is a bijection between
(U1, U{j,l}, U{i,l}, U{i,j})↔ (U 1, U1, U2, U3) (123)
Now since S′ = (U1;U1;U2;U3) is uniform in all full rank matrices, the above bijection then means
that (U1;U{j,l};U{i,l};U{i,j}) is also uniform in all full rank matrices, i.e.,
(U1, U{j,l}, U{i,l}, U{i,j}) ∼ (U 1, U1, U2, U3) (124)
Finally, note that S and S′ have the same distribution, so we have
(V1, V2, V3, V4) ∼ (U1, U1, U2, U3) (125)
Therefore, from (122), (124) and (125), we have proved (121) and (110).
6 Conclusion
We settle a conjecture on the capacity of MDS-TPIR by Freij-Hollanti et al. [6] by constructing
a scheme that beats the conjectured capacity for one particular instance of MDS-TPIR. The rate
achieved by the new scheme is shown to be the best possible rate that can be achieved by any
linear scheme for the same MDS storage code. The insights from the achievability and converse
arguments allow us to characterize the capacity of a class of MDS-TPIR instances. Through another
counterexample, we are also able to prove that the capacity expression cannot be symmetric in T
and Kc parameters, i.e., these parameters cannot be interchangeable in general. Nevertheless, the
general capacity expression for MDS-TPIR remains unknown.
7 Appendix
7.1 Examples of Optimal Schemes over Small Fields
To highlight that the assumption of large field size (which was made convenience) may not be
essential, in this section, we provide two examples of explicit MDS-TPIR capacity achieving schemes
over small fields.
7.1.1 Example 1
Consider the MDS-TPIR instance with (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 3, 2, 2). Note that the capacity of this
setting is 6/11, as established in Theorem 3. We provide an alternative achievable scheme for rate
6/11. In particular, the scheme operates over the binary field and the upload is 4 bits per server
(the query to each server takes values in a set with cardinality 24 = 16).
We assume that each message is L = 6 bits. Denote a1, · · · , a6, b1, · · · , b6 as 12 i.i.d. uniform
bits, ai, bi ∈ F2. Messages W1,W2 are defined in terms of these bits as follows.
W1 = (a1; a2; a3; a4; a5; a6),W2 = (b1; b2; b3; b4; b5; b6) (126)
The storage is specified as
Server 1 : W11 = (a1; a2; a3),W21 = (b1; b2; b3) (127)
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Server 2 : W12 = (a4; a5; a6),W22 = (b4; b5; b6) (128)
Server 3 : W13 = (α1;α2;α3),W23 = (β1;β2;β3) (129)
where α1, α2, α3, β1, β2, β3 are obtained as follows.
α1 = a1 + a2 + a5, β1 = b1 + b2 + b5 (130)
α2 = a1 + a3 + a6, β2 = b1 + b3 + b6 (131)
α3 = a2 + a4 + a6, β3 = b2 + b4 + b6 (132)
Further define
α4 = α1 + α2 + α3 = a3 + a4 + a5 (133)
β4 = β1 + β2 + β3 = b3 + b4 + b5 (134)
Note that each server stores 3 bits of each message and the storage at any 2 servers is just enough
to recover both messages (MDS storage property is satisfied).
Define a function that maps 4 input bits to 3 output bits as follows.
L3(X1,X2, Y1, Y2) = (X1 + Y2,X2 + Y2, Y1 + Y2) (135)
We now describe the PIR scheme. F is a uniform random variable in [1 : 16]. Depending on
the value of F and the desired message index θ ∈ [1 : 2], the user’s query is specified by Table 1.
The double-quotes notation around a random variable represents the query about its realization.
Note that the queries to Server 1 and Server 2 are the same, regardless of the value of θ and the
query to Server 3 is a deterministic function of that to Server 1 and Server 2.
We show that the scheme is both correct and private. The schemes is correct because our
scheme satisfies the important property (P1 ) that from the answers A
[k]
1 , A
[k]
2 , we always know one
undesired bit in A
[k]
3 and then we can extract the 2 desired bits in A
[k]
3 (because if any 1 of the 4
input bits of the L3 function is known, the remaining 3 input bits can be solved from the 3 output
bits). Combining these 2 desired bits with the other 4 desired bits (2 from Server 1 and 2 from
Server 2), we obtain the desired message (easy to verify that these 6 bits are independent). The
property (P1 ) is easy to verify. For example, consider k = 1 and F = 8. From A
[1]
1 , A
[1]
2 , we obtain
b1, b3, b4, b5, from which we further obtain β4 = b3 + b4 + b5 and β4 appears in A
[1]
3 . The scheme is
private because it is easy to verify that for any 2 servers, the queries are identically distributed no
matter which message is desired and then the privacy condition (13) is satisfied.
The scheme downloads 4 bits from Server 1, 4 bits from Server 2 and 3 bits from Serve 3. It
retrieves 6 desired message bits. Therefore the rate is 6/11.
7.1.2 Example 2
Consider the MDS-TPIR instance with (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 3, 2). The capacity of this setting
turns out to be 4/7. The rate can not be more than 4/7 because the capacity of TPIR with
(K,N, T ) = (2, 4, 3) is 4/7 [2] and reducing Kc from 2 to 1 can not hurt. We provide an achievable
scheme for rate 4/7. In particular, the scheme operates over the finite field F13 and the upload is
6 bits per server (the query to each server takes values in a set with cardinality 26 = 64).
We assume that each message is L = 4 symbols. Denote a1, a2, a3, a4, b1, b2, b3, b4 as 8 i.i.d.
uniform symbols, ai, bi ∈ F13. Messages W1,W2 are defined in terms of these symbols as follows.
W1 = (a1; a2; a3; a4),W2 = (b1; b2; b3; b4) (136)
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Table 1: The Scheme for MDS-TPIR with (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 3, 2, 2).
F Prob. Q
[θ]
1 (Server 1) Q
[θ]
2 (Server 2) Q
[1]
3 (Server 3) Q
[2]
3 (Server 3)
1 1/16 “a1, a2, b1, b2” “a4, a5, b4, b5” “L3(α3, α4, β1, β2)” “L3(α1, α2, β3, β4)”
2 1/16 “a1, a3, b1, b2” “a4, a5, b4, b5” “L3(α1, α2, β1, β2)” “L3(α3, α4, β3, β4)”
3 1/16 “a1, a2, b1, b3” “a4, a5, b4, b5” “L3(α3, α4, β3, β4)” “L3(α1, α2, β1, β2)”
4 1/16 “a1, a3, b1, b3” “a4, a5, b4, b5” “L3(α1, α2, β3, β4)” “L3(α3, α4, β1, β2)”
5 1/16 “a1, a2, b1, b2” “a4, a6, b4, b5” “L3(α1, α2, β1, β2)” “L3(α3, α4, β3, β4)”
6 1/16 “a1, a3, b1, b2” “a4, a6, b4, b5” “L3(α3, α4, β1, β2)” “L3(α1, α2, β3, β4)”
7 1/16 “a1, a2, b1, b3” “a4, a6, b4, b5” “L3(α1, α2, β3, β4)” “L3(α3, α4, β1, β2)”
8 1/16 “a1, a3, b1, b3” “a4, a6, b4, b5” “L3(α3, α4, β3, β4)” “L3(α1, α2, β1, β2)”
9 1/16 “a1, a2, b1, b2” “a4, a5, b4, b6” “L3(α3, α4, β3, β4)” “L3(α1, α2, β1, β2)”
10 1/16 “a1, a3, b1, b2” “a4, a5, b4, b6” “L3(α1, α2, β3, β4)” “L3(α3, α4, β1, β2)”
11 1/16 “a1, a2, b1, b3” “a4, a5, b4, b6” “L3(α3, α4, β1, β2)” “L3(α1, α2, β3, β4)”
12 1/16 “a1, a3, b1, b3” “a4, a5, b4, b6” “L3(α1, α2, β1, β2)” “L3(α3, α4, β3, β4)”
13 1/16 “a1, a2, b1, b2” “a4, a6, b4, b6” “L3(α1, α2, β3, β4)” “L3(α3, α4, β1, β2)”
14 1/16 “a1, a3, b1, b2” “a4, a6, b4, b6” “L3(α3, α4, β3, β4)” “L3(α1, α2, β1, β2)”
15 1/16 “a1, a2, b1, b3” “a4, a6, b4, b6” “L3(α1, α2, β1, β2)” “L3(α3, α4, β3, β4)”
16 1/16 “a1, a3, b1, b3” “a4, a6, b4, b6” “L3(α3, α4, β1, β2)” “L3(α1, α2, β3, β4)”
The storage is specified as
Server 1 : W11 = (a1; a2),W21 = (b1; b2) (137)
Server 2 : W12 = (a3; a4),W22 = (b3; b4) (138)
Server 3 : W13 = (α1;α2),W23 = (β1;β2) (139)
Server 4 : W14 = (α3;α4),W24 = (β3;β4) (140)
where α1, α2, α3, α4, β1, β2, β3, β4 are obtained as follows.
α1 = 3a1 + 2a2 + 4a3 + a4, β1 = 3b1 + 2b2 + 4b3 + b4
α2 = 2a1 + 3a2 + a3 + 4a4, β2 = 2b1 + 3b2 + b3 + 4b4
α3 = 3a1 + 12a2 + 4a3 + 6a4, β3 = 3b1 + 12b2 + 4b3 + 6b4
α4 = 12a1 + 3a2 + 6a3 + 4a4, β4 = 12b1 + 3b2 + 6b3 + 4b4 (141)
Note that each server stores 2 symbols of each message and the storage at any 2 servers is just
enough to recover both messages (MDS storage property is satisfied).
We now describe the PIR scheme. F is a uniform random variable in [1 : 64]. The user’s query
is uniform over 64 choices and is specified by Table 2. Note that the queries to servers 1, 2 and 3
are the same, regardless of the value of θ and the query to Server 4 is a deterministic function of
that to servers 1, 2 and 3.
The key to the scheme is that the undesired symbol downloaded from Server 4 is known from that
downloaded from servers 1, 2 and 3, while desired symbols are all independent. This observation
is formalized in the following lemma.
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Table 2: The Scheme for MDS-TPIR with (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 3, 2).
Prob. Q
[θ]
1 (Server 1) Q
[θ]
2 (Server 2) Q
[θ]
3 (Server 3) Q
[1]
4 (Server 4) Q
[2]
4 (Server 4)
1/64 “ai1 , bj1” “ai2 , bj2” “αi3 , βj3” “αi4 + βj4 “αi′4 + βj′4”
i1, j1, i3, j3 are i.i.d. and uniform in {1, 2}. i2, j2 are i.i.d. and uniform in {3, 4}.
i4, j4, i
′
4, j
′
4 are determined as follows.
(i1, i2, i3) = (1, 3, 1) ⇒ i4 = 4, i
′
4 = 3, (j1, j2, j3) = (1, 3, 1) ⇒ j4 = 3, j
′
4 = 4
(i1, i2, i3) = (1, 3, 2) ⇒ i4 = 3, i
′
4 = 4, (j1, j2, j3) = (1, 3, 2) ⇒ j4 = 4, j
′
4 = 3
(i1, i2, i3) = (1, 4, 1) ⇒ i4 = 3, i
′
4 = 4, (j1, j2, j3) = (1, 4, 1) ⇒ j4 = 4, j
′
4 = 3
(i1, i2, i3) = (1, 4, 2) ⇒ i4 = 4, i
′
4 = 3, (j1, j2, j3) = (1, 4, 2) ⇒ j4 = 3, j
′
4 = 4
(i1, i2, i3) = (2, 3, 1) ⇒ i4 = 3, i
′
4 = 4, (j1, j2, j3) = (2, 3, 1) ⇒ j4 = 4, j
′
4 = 3
(i1, i2, i3) = (2, 3, 2) ⇒ i4 = 4, i
′
4 = 3, (j1, j2, j3) = (2, 3, 2) ⇒ j4 = 3, j
′
4 = 4
(i1, i2, i3) = (2, 4, 1) ⇒ i4 = 4, i
′
4 = 3, (j1, j2, j3) = (2, 4, 1) ⇒ j4 = 3, j
′
4 = 4
(i1, i2, i3) = (2, 4, 2) ⇒ i4 = 3, i
′
4 = 4, (j1, j2, j3) = (2, 4, 2) ⇒ j4 = 4, j
′
4 = 3
Lemma 2 For all values of i1, i2, i3, i4, i
′
4, j1, j2, j3, j4, j
′
4 in Table 2, we have
dim(ai1 , ai2 , αi3 , αi4) = 4, dim(ai1 , ai2 , αi3 , αi′4) = 3 (142)
dim(bj1 , bj2 , βj3 , βj4) = 3, dim(bj1 , bj2 , βj3 , βj′4) = 4 (143)
Lemma 2 is proved by brute force, i.e., verifying (142) and (143) hold for each case.
We show that the scheme is both correct and private. The schemes is correct because as
Lemma 2 has proved, the 4 undesired symbols only have dimension 3 and it is easy to see that
the 3 undesired symbols in answers from the first 3 servers have dimension 3. Therefore, from the
answers A
[k]
1 , A
[k]
2 , A
[k]
3 , we always know the undesired symbol in A
[k]
4 . Subtracting the undesired
symbol out from A
[k]
4 , we obtain the desired symbol interference freely. Lemma 2 has proved that
the 4 desired symbols are independent such that we can recover the desired message. The scheme
is private because it is easy to verify that for any 3 servers, the queries are identically distributed
no matter which message is desired and then the privacy condition (13) is satisfied.
The scheme downloads 2 symbols from Server 1, Server 2 and Server 3 each, and 1 symbol from
Server 4. It retrieves 4 desired message symbols. Therefore the rate is 4/7.
Let us conclude this example with the observation that this MDS-TPIR instance with (K,N, T,Kc)
= (2, 4, 3, 2) is not covered by Theorem 3, but we were still able to find its capacity. Let us also
note that we are able to cast this example into a similar framework as Theorem 3 and prove the
existence of PIR schemes that achieve the same capacity for the (x, y)→ (x, y, x+ y, x+2y) MDS
storage code, subject to the assumption of a sufficiently large finite field. The details are repetitive,
and therefore omitted. However, we believe this example may provide useful insights for further
generalizations.
7.2 Achievability Proof for Theorem 3 when T = 2
The proof for the general setting (arbitrary N) follows the same route as the N = 4 example
presented earlier. We assume that each message is comprised of L = N(N − 1) independent
symbols from a sufficiently large finite field Fp.
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7.2.1 Storage Code
The (N − 1, N) MDS storage code is as follows.
Wkn ∈ F
N×1
p , k ∈ [1 : 2], n ∈ [1 : N ] (144)
Wk = (Wk1;Wk2; · · · ;Wk(N−1)) ∈ F
L×1
p (145)
WkN = Wk1 +Wk2 + · · · +Wk(N−1) (146)
7.2.2 Construction of Queries
The query to each server consists of 2(N − 1) vectors, the first N − 1 vectors for W1 (Q
[k]
n (W1))
and the last N − 1 vectors for W2 (Q
[k]
n (W2)). The queries and downloads for Wk, k ∈ [1 : 2] are
described next.
Denote the set of all full rank N ×N matrices over Fp as SN . The user privately chooses two
matrices S, S′, independently and uniformly from SN . Label the rows of S as V1, · · · , VN , and the
rows of S′ as U1, · · · , UN−2, U1, U2. Define ∀n ∈ [1 : N ]
Vn = {V1, · · · , Vn−1, Vn+1, · · · , VN} (147)
Un = {U1, · · · , UN−2, U˜n} (148)
where U˜n, n ∈ [1 : N ] are the rows of U˜ , obtained as follows.
U˜ = MDSN×2(U1;U2) (149)
where MDSN×2 is an N × 2 matrix such that any two of its rows are linearly independent.
When Wk is desired, we have ∀n,
Server n : Q[k]n (Wk) = πn(Vn), A
[k]
n (Wk) = Q
[k]
n (Wk)Wkn. (150)
Desired Symbols Are Independent: From A
[k]
1:N (Wk), we can recover all N(N−1) symbols ofWk.
This is easily seen because the storage is an (N − 1, N) MDS code, no query dimension is repeated
more than N − 1 times and the matrix S has full rank.
When Wk is undesired, we have ∀n,
Server n : Q[k
c]
n (Wk) = π
′
n(Un), A
[kc]
n (Wk) = Q
[kc]
n (Wk)Wkn. (151)
Interfering Symbols Are Dependent and Have Dimension at most N(N −1)− (N −2): Consider
the interfering symbols along the common vectors U i, i ∈ [1 : N − 2]. Note that
U iWk1 + · · ·+ U iWk(N−1) = U iWkN (152)
Therefore (N − 2) interfering symbols are linear combinations of the other N2 − 2N + 2 symbols.
7.2.3 Combining Answers for Efficient Download
Based on the queries, each server has 2(N − 1) symbols, N − 1 in W1, A
[k]
n (W1) and N − 1 in
W2, A
[k]
n (W2) for a total of L = N(N − 1) desired symbols and L = N(N − 1) undesired symbols.
Note that there are at most N2 − 2N + 2 , I independent undesired symbols. Exploiting this
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fact, we will combine the 2(N − 1) queried symbols from each server into (I +L)/N symbols to be
downloaded by the user. Intuitively, (L+ I)/N symbols from each server will give the user a total
of L+ I symbols, from which he can resolve the L desired and I undesired symbols.
Define the following function that maps 2L/N ∈ Z+ input symbols to (L+ I)/N ∈ Z+ output
symbols.
L∗(X1,X2, · · · ,XL/N , Y1, Y2, · · · , YL/N )
= (X1, · · · ,XI/N , Y1, · · · , YI/N ,XI/N+1 + YI/N+1, · · · ,XL/N + YL/N ) (153)
We formalize the combining process in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose each server has L/N desired symbols and L/N undesired symbols. Across all
servers, the L desired symbols are independent, while the L undesired symbols have dimension at
most I, i.e., all L undesired symbols can be expressed as linear combinations of symbols in s, where
s is a set of I symbols. Further, each server contains I/N distinct symbols in s.
The desired and undesired symbols are combined to produce the answers as follows.
A[k]n = L
∗(CnA
[k]
n (W1), CnA
[k]
n (W2)) (154)
where Cn are deterministic L/N × L/N matrices, that are required to satisfy the following two
properties. Denote the first I/N rows of Cn as Cn.
P1. All Cn have full rank.
P2. For all (N − 1)!N distinct realizations of π′n, n ∈ [1 : N ], the I symbols of the undesired
message that are directly downloaded (I/N from each server), C1A
[k]
1 (Wkc), C2A
[k]
2 (Wkc),
· · · , CNA
[k]
N (Wkc) are independent in variables in s.
Then we have the following claim.
Claim. The Cn satisfying the two required properties exist over Fp for a sufficiently large prime p.
8
Proof: This proof of existence will use Schwartz-Zippel lemma [9, 10] about the roots of a
polynomial. The variables for the polynomial are the coefficients of the Cn matrices. Let us start
with an arbitrary choice of π′n, n ∈ [1 : N ]. Since all A
[k]
n (Wkc) can be expressed in terms of the I
symbols in the vector s with constant coefficients, we can express
(C1A
[k]
1 (Wkc); · · · ;CNA
[k]
N (Wkc)) = CI×Is (155)
Now consider the polynomial given by the determinant of C. This is not the zero polynomial9
because we can easily assign values to Cn to make C = I, the identity matrix. This is because the
queried symbols from each server include I/N distinct symbols in s.
Next do the same for every realization of π′n, n ∈ [1 : N ]. As there are N permutations involved,
and each can take (N − 1)! different values, so we have a total of (N − 1)!N different possibilities.
We will consider each of them separately. Each time we find a different C, which gives us a different
non-zero polynomial.
Next consider the determinant of each Cn. This gives us another N non-zero polynomials.
8In fact, the properties are generic, i.e., they are satisfied by almost all matrices over large fields.
9A polynomial is a zero polynomial if all its coefficients are zero.
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For each of these (N − 1)!N + N polynomials, Schwartz-Zippel lemma guarantees that a uni-
formly random choice of Cn produces a non-zero evaluation with high probability over a large field
(probability approaching 1 as p → ∞). Since the intersection of finite number of high probability
events is also a high probability event, there must exist a realization of Cn over a large field for
which all (N − 1)!N +N polynomials simultaneously evaluate to non-zero values, i.e., a realization
that satisfies both properties. Hence, the claim is true.
Next we prove that the scheme retrieves the desired message, and that it is T private.
7.2.4 The Scheme is Correct (Retrieves Desired Message)
Note that from (152), independent undesired message symbols distribute evenly across the databases,
such that Lemma 3 applies. Note that the first 2I/N variables in the output of the L∗ function
are obtained directly, i.e., C1A
[k]
1 (W1), C2A
[k]
2 (W1), · · · , CNA
[k]
N (W1) and C1A
[k]
1 (W2), C2A
[k]
2 (W2),
· · · , CNA
[k]
N (W2) are all directly recovered. By property P2 of Cn, C1A
[k]
1 (Wkc), C2A
[k]
2 (Wkc),
· · · , CNA
[k]
N (Wkc) are linearly independent. Since we have recovered I independent dimensions of
interference, and interference only spans at most I dimensions, all interference is recovered and
eliminated. Further, since the L desired symbols are independent and since the Cn matrices have
full rank, the user is able to recover the L desired message symbols after the interference symbols
are recovered and subtracted from the downloaded equations. Therefore the scheme is correct with
zero error.
7.2.5 The Scheme is Private (to any T = 2 Colluding Servers)
To prove that the scheme is T = 2 private (refer to (13)), it suffices to show that the queries for
any 2 servers are identically distributed, regardless of which message is desired. Since each query
is made up of 2(N − 1) vectors, N − 1 for each message and the vectors for W1 and the vectors for
W2 are generated independently, it suffices to prove that the vectors for one message (say Wk) are
identically distributed, i.e.,(
Q[k]n1(Wk), Q
[k]
n2(Wk)
)
∼
(
Q[k
c]
n1 (Wk), Q
[kc]
n2 (Wk)
)
, ∀n1, n2 ∈ [1 : 4], n1 < n2 (156)
Note that (
Q[k]n1(Wk), Q
[k]
n2(Wk)
)
= (πn1(Vn1), πn2(Vn2)) (157)(
Q[k
c]
n1 (Wk), Q
[kc]
n2 (Wk)
)
=
(
π′n1(Un1), π
′
n2(Un2)
)
(158)
Therefore, to prove (156) it suffices to show the following.(
V1, · · · , Vin1−1 , Vin1+1 , · · · , Vin2−1 , Vin2+1 , · · · , VN , Vin2 , Vin1
)
∼
(
U1, · · · , UN−2, U˜n1 , U˜n2
)
(159)
Because S is uniformly chosen from the set of all full rank matrices, we have(
V1, · · · , Vin1−1 , Vin1+1 , · · · , Vin2−1 , Vin2+1 , · · · , VN , Vin2 , Vin1
)
∼ S (160)
Recall that S = (V1, · · · , VN ). Next we note that there is a bijection between(
U1, · · · , UN−2, U˜n1 , U˜n2
)
↔ S′ (161)
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because of (149) so that there is a bijection between U˜n1 , U˜n2 and U1, U2. Recall that S
′ =(
U1, · · · , UN−2, U1, U2
)
. Now as S′ is uniform over all full rank matrices,
(
U1, · · · , UN−2, U˜n1 , U˜n2
)
is also uniform over all full rank matrices,(
U1, · · · , UN−2, U˜n1 , U˜n2
)
∼ S′ (162)
Finally, we note that S and S′ are identically distributed, so we have
S ∼ S′ (163)
Combining (160), (162) and (163), we arrive at (159) and (156).
7.2.6 Rate Achieved is (N2 −N)/(2N2 − 3N + 2)
The rate achieved is (N2 − N)/(2N2 − 3N + 2), because we download 2N2 − 3N + 2 symbols in
total and the desired message size is N(N − 1) symbols.
7.3 Achievability Proof of Theorem 3 when T > 2
The proof for the general setting follows the same route as the N = 4, T = 3 example presented
earlier. We assume that each message is comprised of L = N(N − 1) independent symbols from a
sufficiently large finite field Fp.
7.3.1 Storage Code
The (N − 1, N) MDS storage code is as follows.
Wkn ∈ F
N×1
p , k ∈ [1 : 2], n ∈ [1 : N ] (164)
Wk = (Wk1;Wk2; · · · ;Wk(N−1)) ∈ F
L×1
p (165)
WkN = Wk1 +Wk2 + · · · +Wk(N−1) (166)
7.3.2 Construction of Queries
The query to each server consists of two vector spaces, one for W1 (span of the rows of Q
[k]
n (W1))
and one for W2 (span of the rows of Q
[k]
n (W2)). The queries and downloads for Wk, k ∈ [1 : 2] are
described next.
Denote the set of all full rank N ×N matrices over Fp as SN . The user privately chooses two
matrices S, S′, independently and uniformly from SN . Label the rows of S as V1, · · · , VN , and the
rows of S′ as U1, · · · , UN−T , U1, · · · , UT . Define ∀n ∈ [1 : N ]
Vn = {V1, · · · , Vn−1, Vn+1, · · · , VN} (167)
Un = {U1, · · · , UN−T , U˜(n−1)(T−1)+1, · · · , U˜n(T−1)} (168)
where U˜1, · · · , U˜N(T−1) are the rows of U˜ , obtained as follows.
U˜ = P (U1; · · · ;UT ) (169)
P is a deterministic N(T − 1) × T matrix that is chosen in such a way that it allows a bijective
mapping between the Un or Vn spaces that may be observed by any set of up to T colluding servers.
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Intuitively, the only requirement on this matrix is that it is sufficiently ‘generic’, so that almost
all N(T − 1)× T matrices over large finite fields are acceptable. Here unlike the previous example
where we explicitly construct the matrix P , we will specify (later) the properties of this matrix and
prove that such a matrix exists.
When Wk is desired, we have ∀n,
Server n : Q[k]n (Wk) = B(Vn), A
[k]
n (Wk) = Q
[k]
n (Wk)Wkn. (170)
Desired Symbols Are Independent: From A
[k]
1:N (Wk), we can recover all N(N − 1) symbols of
Wk. This is easily seen because the storage is an (N − 1, N) MDS code and the matrix S has full
rank.
When Wk is undesired, we have ∀n,
Server n : Q[k
c]
n (Wk) = B(Un), A
[kc]
n (Wk) = Q
[kc]
n (Wk)Wkn. (171)
Interfering Symbols Are Dependent and Have Dimension at most N(N−1)−(N−T ): Consider
the interfering symbols along the common vectors U i, i ∈ [1 : N − T ]. Note that
U iWk1 + · · ·+ U iWk(N−1) = U iWkN (172)
Therefore (N − T ) interfering symbols are linear combinations of the other N2 − 2N + T symbols.
7.3.3 Combining Answers for Efficient Download
The idea of combining is the same as the T = 2 setting. That is, we will combine the 2(N − 1)
queried symbols from each server into (2N2 − 3N + T )/N = (L+ I)/N symbols to be downloaded
by the user. We will use the same combining function L∗ defined in (153). The difference lies in the
combining matrices Cn. For T = 2, Cn are deterministic and the scheme has zero-error, while here
Cn are random and the scheme has ǫ-error, with ǫ approaching zero as the message size approaches
infinity. The combining process is described in the following lemma, which corresponds to Lemma
3 (with differences brought by random Cn accounted).
Lemma 4 Suppose each server has L/N desired symbols and L/N undesired symbols from Fp.
Across all servers, the L desired symbols are independent, while the L undesired symbols have
dimension at most I, i.e., all L undesired symbols can be expressed as linear combinations of
symbols in s, where s is a set of I symbols. Further, each server contains I/N distinct symbols in
s.
The desired and undesired symbols are combined to produce the answers as follows.
A[k]n = L
∗(CnA
[k]
n (W1), CnA
[k]
n (W2)) (173)
where Cn are random L/N×L/N matrices, that are required to satisfy the following two properties.
Denote the first I/N rows of Cn as Cn.
P1. All Cn are full rank.
P2. The I symbols of the undesired message that are directly downloaded (I/N from each server),
C1A
[k]
1 (Wkc), C2A
[k]
2 (Wkc), · · · , CNA
[k]
N (Wkc) are independent in variables in s.
28
Then the following claim must be true.
Claim. The probability that Cn, n ∈ [1 : N ] with each element chosen independently and uniformly
over Fp, satisfy the two required properties, approaches 1 as p→∞.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that I/N is an integer. There is no loss of generality
because if I/N is not an integer, we may repeat the scheme a number of times (say M) such that
IM/N becomes an integer.
The proof relies on Schwartz-Zippel lemma [9, 10] about the roots of a polynomial. The variables
for the polynomial are the coefficients of the Cn matrices. Consider an arbitrary realization of the
query spaces Un. Generate uniformly random Cn, independent of Un. Given Un, n ∈ [1 : N ], since
all A
[k]
n (Wkc) can be expressed in terms of the I symbols of the vector s with constant coefficients,
we can express
(C1A
[k]
1 (Wkc); · · · ;CNA
[k]
N (Wkc)) = CI×Is (174)
Now consider the polynomial given by the determinant of C. This is not the zero polynomial
because we can easily assign values to Cn to make C = I, the identity matrix. This is because each
server contains I/N distinct symbols in s. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, a non-zero polynomial
evaluates to a non-zero value with probability approaching 1 as the field size p increases and Cn
are chosen uniformly over Fp. Therefore Property P2 is satisfied with high probability.
Next consider the determinant of each Cn. This gives us another N non-zero polynomials.
When we choose Cn uniformly, the determinant of Cn is not zero almost surely for large p, so that
Cn have full rank and Property P1 is satisfied with high probability.
Now, because Property P1 and P2 are each satisfied with probability approaching 1, the prob-
ability that the two are simultaneously satisfied also approaches 1 (union bound). Since this is true
conditioned on every possible realization of Un, n ∈ [1 : N ], it is also true unconditionally.
Next we prove that the scheme retrieves the desired message, and that it is T private.
7.3.4 The Scheme is Correct (Retrieves Desired Message)
Note that from (172), independent undesired message symbols distribute evenly across the databases,
such that Lemma 4 applies. Note that the first 2I/N variables in the output of the L∗ function
are obtained directly, i.e., C1A
[k]
1 (W1), C2A
[k]
2 (W1), · · · , CNA
[k]
N (W1) and C1A
[k]
1 (W2), C2A
[k]
2 (W2),
· · · , CNA
[k]
N (W2) are all directly recovered. By property P2 of Cn, C1A
[k]
1 (Wkc), C2A
[k]
2 (Wkc),
· · · , CNA
[k]
N (Wkc) are linearly independent with probability approaching 1 as p → ∞. Since we
have recovered I independent dimensions of interference, and interference only spans at most I
dimensions, all interference is recovered and eliminated. Further, since the L desired symbols are
independent and since the Cn matrices have full rank, the user is able to recover the L desired
message symbols after the interference symbols are recovered and subtracted from the downloaded
equations. Therefore the scheme is correct with a probability of error ǫ that approaches 0 as the
field size p approaches infinity. Note that since each message is comprised of L independent and
uniformly random symbols in Fp, as p approaches infinity, the size of each message also approaches
infinity. So, given any ǫ > 0, we can find a sufficiently large p, and a correspondingly large message
size value such that the probability of error of the scheme described above, is less than ǫ.
29
7.3.5 The Scheme is Private (to any T Colluding Servers)
To prove that the scheme is T private (refer to (13)), it suffices to show that the queries for any
T servers are identically distributed, regardless of which message is desired. Since each query
is made up of two vector spaces, one for each message and the two vector spaces are generated
independently, it suffices to prove that the query spaces for one message (say Wk) are identically
distributed whether it is desired or undesired. Consider an index set T = {i1, i2, · · · , iT } ⊂ [1 : N ]
such that i1 < i2 < · · · < iT . For all T , we require(
Q
[k]
i1
(Wk), · · · , Q
[k]
iT
(Wk)
)
∼
(
Q
[kc]
i1
(Wk), · · · , Q
[kc]
iT
(Wk)
)
(175)
⇐⇒ (B(Vi1), · · · ,B(ViT )) ∼ (B(Ui1), · · · ,B(UiT )) (176)
Note that
(B(Vi1),B(Vi2), · · · ,B(ViT ))
=
(
B({VT c , Vi2 , · · · , ViT }),B({VT c , Vi1 , Vi3 , · · · , ViT }),B({VT c , Vi1 , · · · , ViT−1})
)
(177)
Next we transform the spaces on the RHS of (176) to the form that is the same as (177). To do
this, we require the matrix P to satisfy the following properties.
P1. For all T ∗ = {j1, j2, · · · , jT−1} ⊂ [1 : N ], |T
∗| = T − 1, j1 < j2 < · · · < jT−1, there exists
a function mT ∗(P ) that returns a non-zero vector which lies simultaneously in the spans of
each of Pjt , P ((jt− 1)(T − 1)+ 1 : jt(T − 1), :), t ∈ [1 : T − 1]. Note that mT ∗(P ) is a 1×T
row vector that only depends on P (it does not depend on U).
P2. For each T = {i1, i2, · · · , iT } ⊂ [1 : N ], the vectors mT ∗(P ),∀T
∗ ⊂ T , |T ∗| = T − 1 (found
in P1) are linearly independent. Equivalently, we require the following T × T matrix to have
full rank.
PT , (m{i[1:T ]/{T}}(P );m{i[1:T ]/{T−1}}(P ); · · · ;m{i[1:T ]/{1}}(P )) (178)
Claim. The P satisfying the two required properties exists over Fp for a sufficiently large p.
Proof: Similar to the proof of existence of Cn matrices presented earlier, this proof of existence
will use Schwartz-Zippel lemma [9, 10] about the roots of a polynomial. The variables for the
polynomial are the coefficients of the P matrix. Since P is a N(T − 1) × T matrix, we have a
total of NT (T − 1) variables. Define a set P that is comprised of all non-zero polynomials with
NT (T − 1) variables of P as its variables, and coefficients from Fp.
We first consider Property P1. Recall that there are
(
N
T−1
)
choices for T ∗. Let us start with an
arbitrary choice of T ∗ = {j1, j2, · · · , jT−1} such that j1 < j2 < · · · < jT−1. The required non-zero
vector mT ∗(P ) is found as follows.
mT ∗(P ) = H1Pj1 = H2Pj1 = · · · = HT−1PjT−1 (179)
⇒
[
H1 H2 · · · HT−1
]

Pj1 Pj1 · · · Pj1
−Pj2 0 · · · 0
... −Pj3
. . . 0
0 0 0 −PjT−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,PJ
=
[
0 0 · · · 0
]
(180)
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where Pjt , t ∈ [1 : T − 1] are (T − 1) × T matrices, 0 is the (T − 1) × T matrix with all elements
equal to 0 and PJ is a (T − 1)
2 × T (T − 2) matrix. Note that the left null space of PJ is exactly
of one dimension if PJ has full rank. Consider the matrix P
∗
J , which is a square matrix formed
by the last T (T − 2) rows of PJ . We claim that the determinant of P
∗
J is a non-zero polynomial,
i.e., |P ∗J | ∈ P. This is because we can identify a specific choice of Pjt such that |P
∗
J | is not zero, as
follows. We set Pjt to be the matrix obtained by inserting an all zero column as the (T + 1− t)
th
column of the (T − 1) × (T − 1) identity matrix IT−1. Equivalently, this means that
PjtU = (U1; · · · ;UT−t;UT+2−t; · · · ;UT ), t ∈ [1 : T − 1] (181)
Since U1, · · · , UT are independent, mT ∗(P )U can only be some scaled version of the U1 vector.
This means that P ∗J has full rank (which is also easily verified by plugging the vaules of Pjt in P
∗
J ).
Therefore, |P ∗J | ∈ P. To make mT ∗(P ) a function, i.e., to remove ambiguity due to scaling factors,
let us normalize the vector [H1, · · · ,HT−1] by its first element, h, such that this vector is unique
(scaling is fixed). Note that h ∈ P because if we use the same special choice of Pjt as above, we
find that h = 1 (non-zero). With normalized [H1, · · · ,HT−1], we obtain mT ∗(P ). Note that each
element of mT ∗(P ) also belongs to P.
Now do the same for every possible choice of T ∗. There are
(
N
T−1
)
possibilities. We will consider
each of them separately. Each time we obtain different |P ∗J |, h ∈ P and find a different mT ∗(P ).
Putting all of these together, we have a set of 2
( N
T−1
)
non-zero polynomials.
Next consider Property P2. Similarly, we consider all choices of T separately. For each choice
of T = {i1, i2, · · · , iT } such that i1 < i2 · · · < iT , we consider the determinant of PT . This
determinant polynomial is non-zero because we may set Pit , t ∈ [1 : T ] to be the matrix obtained
by inserting an all zero column as the (T + 1− t)th column of IT−1, such that the common vector
mT ∗(P ),∀T
∗ ∈ T , |T ∗| = T − 1 can be computed explicitly
PitU = (U1; · · · , UT−t;UT+2−t · · · ;UT ) (182)
m{i[1:T ]/{t}}(P ) = eT+1−t,∀t ∈ [1 : T ] (183)
where ei represents the 1×T unit row vector with a 1 in the i
th location and 0 at all other locations.
Therefore, PT is an identity matrix and the determinant is 1 (non-zero). With all choices of T , we
have another
(
N
T
)
non-zero polynomials.
By Schwartz-Zippel lemma, as the field size grows, for each of the polynomials mentioned
above, a uniform choice of P produces a non-zero evaluation with probability approaching 1. By
the union bound, the probability that all polynomials simultaneously produce a non-zero value also
approaches 1. In particular, for a sufficiently large field this probability is not zero, so there must
exist a P matrix that satisfies both properties.
Because of the two properties, we may equivalently represent Q
[kc]
it
(Wk), t ∈ [1 : T ] as
Q
[kc]
it
(Wk) = B(Ui) = B({U,U{i[1:T ]/{1}}, · · · , U{i[1:T ]/{t−1}}, U{i[1:T ]/{t+1}}, · · · , U{i[1:T ]/{T}}}), (184)
We are now ready to prove the privacy condition (110).
(176)⇐⇒
(
B({VT c , Vi2 , · · · , ViT }),B({VT c , Vi1 , Vi3 , · · · , ViT }),B({VT c , Vi1 , · · · , ViT−1})
)
∼
(
B({U,U{i[1:T ]/{2}}, · · · , U{i[1:T ]/{T}}}),B({U,U{i[1:T ]/{1}}, U{i[1:T ]/{3}}, · · · , U{i[1:T ]/{T}}}),
· · · ,B({U,U{i[1:T ]/{1}}, · · · , U{i[1:T ]/{T−1}}})
)
(185)
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Therefore, it suffices to show the following.
(VT c , Vi1 , Vi2 , · · · , ViT ) ∼ (U,U{i[1:T ]/{1}}, U{i[1:T ]/{2}}, · · · , U{i[1:T ]/{T}}) (186)
Because S is uniformly chosen from the set of all full rank matrices, we have
(VT c , Vi1 , Vi2 , · · · , ViT ) ∼ (V1, V2, · · · , VN ) (187)
Because of Property P2, there is a bijection between
(U,U{i[1:T ]/{1}}, U{i[1:T ]/{2}}, · · · , U{i[1:T ]/{T}})↔ (U,U) (188)
Now since S′ = (U ;U) is uniform in all full rank matrices, the bijection implies that (U , U{i[1:T ]/{1}},
U{i[1:T ]/{2}}, · · · , U{i[1:T ]/{T}}) is also uniform in all full rank matrices, i.e.,
(U,U{i[1:T ]/{1}}, U{i[1:T ]/{2}}, · · · , U{i[1:T ]/{T}}) ∼ (U,U) (189)
Finally, note that S and S′ have the same distribution, so we have
(V1, V2, · · · , VN ) ∼ (U,U) (190)
Therefore, from (187), (189) and (190), we have proved (186) and (176).
7.3.6 Rate Achieved is (N2 −N)/(2N2 − 3N + T )
The rate achieved is (N2 −N)/(2N2 − 3N + T ), because we download 2N2 − 3N + T symbols in
total and the desired message size is N(N − 1) symbols.
7.4 Converse for Arbitrary K
In this section, we consider the information theoretic converse of MDS-TPIR, for two scenarios,
one with (K,N, T,Kc) = (K, 4, 2, 2) and the other with (K,N, T,Kc) such that N < T +Kc. For
both scenarios, we provide outer bounds that hold for arbitrary K.
Let us start with two useful lemmas that hold for arbitrary K,N, T,Kc.
Lemma 5 For all T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T and k, k′ ∈ [1 : K],
(A
[k]
T ,W1, · · · ,WK ,F ,G) ∼ (A
[k′]
T ,W1, · · · ,WK ,F ,G) (191)
Proof: From (13), we know that Q
[k]
T ∼ Q
[k′]
T . Combining with (11), we have
H(Q
[θ]
T |F) = 0 (192)
From (10), we have
I(θ;W1, · · · ,WK ,F ,G) = 0 (193)
(192)
=⇒ I(θ;W1, · · · ,WK ,F ,G, Q
[θ]
T ) = 0 (194)
(8)(11)(12)
=⇒ I(θ;W1, · · · ,WK ,F ,G, A
[θ]
T ) = 0 (195)
=⇒ (A
[k]
T ,W1, · · · ,WK ,F ,G) ∼ (A
[k′]
T ,W1, · · · ,WK ,F ,G) (196)
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Lemma 6 For all Kc = {n1, n2, · · · , nKc} ⊂ [1 : N ],
H(A
[1]
Kc
|W1,F ,G) =
∑
n∈Kc
H(A[1]n |W1,F ,G) (197)
Proof: From (8) and (9), we know that for any Kc servers, the stored information is independent.
H(WkKc) =
∑
n∈Kc
H(Wkn),∀k ∈ [1 : K] (198)
(10)
=⇒ H(W2Kc , · · · ,WKKc|W1,F ,G) =
∑
n∈Kc
K∑
k=2
H(Wkn|W1,F ,G) (199)
As answers are functions of the storage, the answers from any Kc servers are independent as well.
Consider two arbitrary subsets of Kc that have no overlap, K1,K2 ⊂ Kc,K1 ∩ K2 = ∅.
I(A
[1]
K1
;A
[1]
K2
|W1,F ,G)
≤ I(A
[1]
K1
;A
[1]
K2
,W2K2 , · · · ,WKK2|W1,F ,G) (200)
(11)(12)
= I(A
[1]
K1
;W2K2 , · · · ,WKK2 |W1,F ,G) (201)
(11)(12)
≤ I(W2K1 , · · · ,WKK1 ;W2K2 , · · · ,WKK2 |W1,F ,G) (202)
(199)
= 0 (203)
Using (203) repeatedly, we obtain (197).
Next we proceed to the two scenarios. To highlight the parameter K, in this section, the
capacity C and the download cost D are denoted as C(K) and D(K), respectively.
7.4.1 (K,N, T,Kc) = (K, 4, 2, 2)
For the setting with (K,N, T,Kc) = (K, 4, 2, 2), we obtain a recursive upper bound that holds for
arbitrary K. This result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 For the class of MDS-TPIR instances with (K,N, T,Kc) = (K, 4, 2, 2), with arbitrary
K, the following recursive relation on the capacity outer bound C(K) ≥ C(K) holds.
C(K) ≤
(
1 +
3
8
(
1
C(K − 1)
)
+
(
1−
(
2
3
)K−1) 3
4
)−1
,∀K ≥ 2
C(1) = 1 (204)
Proof: Consider an MDS-TPIR instance with (K,N, T,Kc) = (K, 4, 2, 2). When K = 1,
C(1) = 1 is a trivial bound on C(1). Next we consider K ≥ 2. Define
C(K) = L/H(A
[1]
1:4|F ,G) (205)
C(K − 1) = L/H(A
[2]
1:4|W1,F ,G) (206)
C(K) is a valid outer bound on C(K), since
C(K) = L/H(A
[1]
1:4|F ,G) ≥ L/D(K) = C(K) (207)
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Similarly, C(K − 1) is a valid outer bound on C(K − 1). Now, substituting (205) and (206) to
(204), we have
H(A
[1]
1:4|F ,G)/L ≥ 1 +
3
8
H(A
[2]
1:4|W1,F ,G)/L +
(
1−
(
2
3
)K−1) 3
4
(208)
We proceed to prove (208). To simplify the notation, we define (W1i,W2i, · · · ,WKi) =W∗i, i ∈
[1 : N ].
H(A
[1]
1:4|F ,G)
(16)
= H(A
[1]
1:4,W1|F ,G) + o(L)L (209)
(10)
= H(W1) +H(A
[1]
1 |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[1]
2:4|W1, A
[1]
1 ,F ,G) + o(L)L (210)
≥ H(W1) +H(A
[1]
1 |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[1]
3:4|W1,W∗1, A
[1]
1 ,F ,G) + o(L)L (211)
(6)(8)(12)
= L+H(A
[1]
1 |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[1]
3:4|W1,W∗1,F ,G) + o(L)L (212)
(8)(191)
= L+H(A
[2]
1 |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[2]
3:4|W1,W∗1,F ,G) + o(L)L (213)
Advancing the databases indices, from (213), we have
H(A
[1]
1:4|F ,G)
≥ L+H(A
[2]
1 |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[2]
2:3|W1,W∗1,F ,G) + o(L)L (214)
Adding (213) and (214), we have
H(A
[1]
1:4|F ,G) + o(L)L
≥ L+H(A
[2]
1 |W1,F ,G) +
1
2
(
H(A
[2]
3:4|W1,W∗1,F ,G) +H(A
[2]
2:3|W1,W∗1,F ,G)
)
(215)
≥ L+H(A
[2]
1 |W1,F ,G) +
1
2
(
H(A
[2]
2:4|W1,W∗1,F ,G) +H(A
[2]
3 |W1,W∗1,F ,G)
)
(216)
(8)(9)(201)
= L+H(A
[2]
1 |W1,F ,G) +
1
2
H(A
[2]
3 |W1,F ,G) +
1
2
H(A
[2]
2:4|W1,W∗1,F ,G) (217)
where we use the sub-modular property of entropy functions to obtain (216). Now consider the
term H(A
[2]
2:4|W1,W∗1,F ,G). This corresponds to the total download for the setting where we have
3 servers (servers 2, 3 and 4), K − 1 messages (W2,W3, · · · ,WK), each message is of length L/2
and the MDS code is fully replicated (conditioning on W∗1, each other server contains the other
half information of entropy L/2 about each message), i.e., the TPIR setting. W2 is the desired
message. As the capacity of this TPIR setting is 13
(
1−
(
2
3
)K−1)−1
[2], we have
H(A
[2]
2:4|W1,W∗1,F ,G) ≥ 3
(
1−
(
2
3
)K−1) L
2
(218)
Substituting back to (217) and advancing database indices, we have ∀i, j ∈ [1 : 4], i 6= j,
H(A
[1]
1:4|F ,G) + o(L)L
34
≥ L+H(A
[2]
i |W1,F ,G) +
1
2
H(A
[2]
j |W1,F ,G) +
(
1−
(
2
3
)K−1) 3L
4
(219)
Adding (219) for all i, j ∈ [1 : 4], we have
H(A
[1]
1:4|F ,G) + o(L)L
≥ L+
1
4
4∑
i=1
H(A
[2]
i |W1,F ,G) +
1
8
4∑
j=1
H(A
[2]
j |W1,F ,G) +
(
1−
(
2
3
)K−1) 3L
4
(220)
≥ L+
3
8
H(A
[2]
1:4|W1,F ,G) +
(
1−
(
2
3
)K−1) 3L
4
(221)
Normalizing both sides by L, we arrive at (208).
Two observations from the converse argument are listed below.
1. When we set K = 2, we obtain the information theoretic bound 8/13.
C(2) ≤ C(2) (222)
(204)
≤ (1 + 3/8 × 1/C(1) + (1− 2/3) × 3/4)−1 (223)
(204)
= (1 + 3/8 × 1 + (1− 2/3) × 3/4)−1 = 8/13 (224)
2. As K → ∞, the capacity upper bound converges to 5/14. Since the MDS-TPIR scheme of
Freij-Hollanti et al. [6] achieves the rate 1/4 for this setting as K → ∞, we note that the
asymptotic optimality of the scheme remains open.
7.4.2 (K,N, T,Kc) with N < T +Kc
For the setting with (K,N, T,Kc) and N < T +Kc, we obtain a recursive upper bound that holds
for arbitrary K. This result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 For the class of MDS-TPIR instances (K,N, T,Kc) such that N < T + Kc, with
arbitrary K,N, T,Kc, the following recursive relation on the capacity outer bound C(K) ≥ C(K)
holds.
C(K) ≤
(
1 +
N − T
N
(
1
C(K − 1)
)
+ (K − 1)
(
1−
N − T
Kc
))−1
,∀K ≥ 2
C(1) = 1 (225)
Therefore, for constant N,T,Kc, when K → ∞, C(K) decreases linearly with K such that down-
loading everything (rate 1/K) is order optimal.
Proof: Consider an MDS-TPIR instance (K,N, T,Kc) such that N < T +Kc. When K = 1,
C(1) = 1 is a trivial bound on C(1). Next we consider K ≥ 2. Define
C(K) = L/H(A
[1]
1:N |F ,G) (226)
C(K − 1) = L/H(A
[2]
1:N |W1,F ,G) (227)
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C(K) is a valid outer bound on C(K), since
C(K) = L/H(A
[1]
1:N |F ,G) ≥ L/D(K) = C(K) (228)
Similarly, C(K − 1) is a valid outer bound on C(K − 1). Now, substituting (226) and (227) to
(225), we have
H(A
[1]
1:N |F ,G)
L
≥ 1 +
N − T
N
H(A
[2]
1:N |W1,F ,G)
L
+ (K − 1)
(
1−
N − T
Kc
)
(229)
We proceed to prove (229). Consider an index set N ⊂ [1 : N ] with cardinality |N | = N − T <
Kc. Denote the complement of N as N
c.
H(A
[1]
1:N |F ,G)
(16)
= H(A
[1]
1:N ,W1|F ,G) + o(L)L (230)
(10)
= H(W1) +H(A
[1]
N |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[1]
N c |W1, A
[1]
N ,F ,G) + o(L)L (231)
(6)(197)
≥ L+
∑
n∈N
H(A[1]n |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[1]
N c |W1,W∗N , A
[1]
N ,F ,G) + o(L)L (232)
(8)(11)(12)
= L+
∑
n∈N
H(A[1]n |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[1]
N c |W1,W∗N ,F ,G) + o(L)L (233)
(8)(191)
= L+
∑
n∈N
H(A[2]n |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[2]
N c |W1,W∗N ,F ,G) + o(L)L (234)
(8)(11)(12)
= L+
∑
n∈N
H(A[2]n |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[2]
1:N |W1,W∗N ,F ,G) + o(L)L (235)
(16)
≥ L+
∑
n∈N
H(A[2]n |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[2]
1:N ,W2|W1,W∗N ,F ,G) + o(L)L (236)
≥ L+
∑
n∈N
H(A[2]n |W1,F ,G) +H(W2|W1,W∗N ,F ,G) +H(A
[2]
1:N |W1,W2,W∗N ,F ,G) + o(L)L
(237)
(10)(8)(9)
= L+
∑
n∈N
H(A[2]n |W1,F ,G) + L(Kc − |N |)/Kc +H(A
[2]
1:N |W1,W2,W∗N ,F ,G) + o(L)L (238)
(8)(11)(12)
= L+
∑
n∈N
H(A[2]n |W1,F ,G) + L(Kc −N + T )/Kc +H(A
[2]
N c |W1,W2,W∗N ,F ,G) + o(L)L
(239)
To bound the term H(A
[2]
N c |W1,W2,W∗N ,F ,G), we repeat (233) to (239) for messagesW3, · · · ,WK .
This gives us
H(A
[1]
1:N |F ,G)
≥ L+
∑
n∈N
H(A[2]n |W1,F ,G) + L(K − 1)
(
1−
N − T
Kc
)
+ o(L)L (240)
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Consider (240) for all subsets of [1 : N ] that have exactly N −T elements and average over all such
subsets. We have
H(A
[1]
1:N |F ,G)
≥ L+
1( N
N−T
) ∑
N :|N |=N−T
∑
n∈N
H(A[2]n |W1,F ,G) + L(K − 1)
(
1−
N − T
Kc
)
+ o(L)L (241)
≥ L+
N − T
N
H(A
[2]
1:N |W1,F ,G) + L(K − 1)
(
1−
N − T
Kc
)
+ o(L)L (242)
Letting L→∞ and normalizing by L, we have proved (229) and (225).
Based on Theorem 5 the following observations are relevant.
1. When we set K = 2,Kc = N − 1, we obtain the information theoretic bound for Theorem 3,
i.e., (N2 −N)/(2N2 − 3N + T ).
C(2) ≤ C(2) (243)
(225)
≤
(
1 +
N − T
N
×
1
C(1)
+ (2− 1)
(
1−
N − T
N − 1
))−1
(244)
(225)
=
(
1 +
N − T
N
× 1 +
T − 1
N − 1
)−1
=
N2 −N
2N2 − 3N + T
(245)
2. As K →∞, Theorem 5 shows that the capacity decays as 1/K, so that it converges to 0. As
a sanity check, we note that indeed, the MDS-TPIR scheme of Freij-Hollanti et al. [6], which
does not depend on the number of messages K, does not apply when N < T +Kc. Thus, in
this case the asymptotic optimality as K →∞ is trivially settled.
7.5 Restricted Colluding Sets
Recall that for the setting of our counterexample, i.e., (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 2, 2), while the linear
capacity is settled, the information theoretic capacity remains open. In particular, the best infor-
mation theoretic capacity upper bound that we were able to obtain is 8/13. To gain insights into
the potential tightness of this bound, here we look into the capacity of this setting with restricted
colluding sets, a line of inquiry recently initiated by Tajeddine et al. in [11]. Our motivation for
studying restricted colluding sets comes from the following observation.
Consider TPIR, for which the capacity is known [2]. The TPIR formulation allows the possibility
that any set of up to T servers may collude. However, suppose we relax the privacy constraint,
by allowing only collusions between cyclically contiguous servers, i.e., the colluding servers must
belong to the set of servers indexed {n, n+1, · · · , n+ T − 1} for some n ∈ [1 : N ], with the indices
interpreted modulo N . Because of the symmetry that is still maintained across servers, it is readily
verified that the converse proof for TPIR in [2] still goes through unchanged. Thus, even though
the restriction on colluding sets to cyclically contiguous servers relaxes the privacy constraint, it
does not affect the capacity of TPIR.
This leads us to question if a similar property might hold for MDS-TPIR. If so, then we could
gain insights into the capacity of MDS-TPIR by imposing similar restrictions on the colluding sets.
This line of thought leads us to two somewhat contrasting observations, that are presented in the
following two subsections.
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7.5.1 (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 2, 2) with Cyclically Adjacent Colluding Sets
Our first observation is in favor of the tightness of the upper bound 8/13. Indeed, if colluding sets
were restricted to cyclically contiguous sets then 8/13 is the capacity for the MDS-TPIR setting
(K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 2, 2). This observation is summarized in a bit more detail next.
For our counterexample we considered the MDS-TPIR setting (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 2, 2) where
any 2 servers may collude. Suppose, now we restrict the colluding sets of servers to cyclically
adjacent pairs, i.e., any one of {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {4, 1}. Essentially we have relaxed the privacy
constraint by eliminating the possibilities that Server 1 might collude with Server 3, or that Server
2 might collude with Server 4. For this setting, we show that the capacity is 8/13.
The converse is similar to that with T = 2, presented in Section 7.4.1. (218) holds with
restricted colluding sets when K = 2, because we are left with only K − 1 = 1 message. All other
steps follow similarly because the assumption of symmetry across servers holds under cyclically
adjacent colluding sets. As a result, the capacity upper bound of 8/13 (refer to (224)) holds here.
Next, we summarize the achievable scheme. The message construction and the storage code are
specified as follows.
Wkn ∈ F
4×1
p , k ∈ [1 : 2], n ∈ [1 : 4] (246)
Wk = (Wk1;Wk2) ∈ F
8×1
p (247)
Wk3 =Wk1 +Wk2,Wk4 =Wk1 + 2Wk2 (248)
The construction of queries is similar to that with T = 2 in Section 3. The query to each server Q
[k]
n
is comprised of two parts, Q
[k]
n (W1), Q
[k]
n (W2). Each part contains 2 row vectors, along which the
server should project its corresponding stored message symbols. To generate the query vectors, the
user privately chooses two matrices, S = (V1;V2;V3;V4) and S
′ = (U0;U1;U2;U3), independently
and uniformly from S4, the set of all full rank 4× 4 matrices over Fp. Define
V1 = {V1, V2}, U1 = {U0, U1 + U2} (249)
V2 = {V2, V3}, U2 = {U0, U1 + 2U2} (250)
V3 = {V3, V4}, U3 = {U0, U1} (251)
V4 = {V4, V1}, U4 = {U0, U2} (252)
Independent random orderings of the rows in Vn are the queries to Server n for the desired message
and independent random orderings of the rows in Un are the queries to Server n for the undesired
message. The rate achieved is 8/13 because the 8 desired symbols along the Vi vectors are all
independent and the 8 undesired symbols occupy only 5 dimensions (the 4 symbols along U0 con-
tribute only 2 independent dimensions and the remaining 4 symbols contribute only 3 independent
dimensions). Privacy follows from the observation that for each cyclically adjacent colluding set of
servers, say Server 1 and Server 2, the sets V1,V2 intersect in one of their elements, as do the sets
U1,U2, and both are otherwise uniformly random, thus making the distinction of U ,V invisible to
the colluding servers. Note that this scheme is not private to the non-adjacent colluding servers, say
Server 1 and Server 3, because, V1,V3 contain no common vectors, while U1,U3 do share a common
vector. The remaining details are virtually identical to the settings already covered in Section 3
and Section 7.2 and are omitted.
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7.5.2 Disjoint Colluding Sets of T Servers Each
Our second observation provides a counterpoint to the first observation. The first observation
favored the tightness of 8/13 bound based on the insight originating from TPIR, that certain
restrictions on colluding sets may not affect capacity. The second observation challenges this
viewpoint by showing that insights from TPIR do not carry over to MDS-TPIR.
Consider again the TPIR problem. Suppose T divides N , i.e., mT = N for some m ∈ Z+,
and we partition the N servers into the m disjoint sets of T elements each: T1 = {1, 2, · · · , T},
T2 = {T +1, T +2, · · · , 2T}, · · · , Tm = {(m− 1)T +1, (m− 1)T +2, · · · , N}. Further, suppose we
relax the privacy constraint and allow collusions between only those servers that belong to the same
Ti, i ∈ [1 : m]. Then, note that the TPIR problem with restricted colluding sets becomes equivalent
to the PIR problem with N/T = m servers.10 However, the capacity of PIR with N/T servers is
the same as the capacity of TPIR with N servers. Therefore, relaxing the privacy constraint by
restricting the colluding sets to disjoint sets of cardinality T each, in the manner described above,
does not affect the capacity of TPIR. However, as we will show next, the same is not true for
MDS-TPIR.
Consider MDS-TPIR with (K,N, T,Kc) = (2, 4, 3, 2), where any T = 2 of the N = 4 servers
may collude. From Theorem 3 we know that the capacity of this setting is 6/11. However, now
suppose we partition the servers into disjoint sets T1 = {1, 2}, T2 = {3, 4}, each of cardinality
T = 2. Now we allow collusions only between servers in the same Ti set, i.e., Server 1 can only
collude with Server 2, while Server 3 can only collude with Server 4. Then, in contrast to TPIR
where such a restriction on colluding sets does not affect the capacity, we now show that with these
restricted colluding sets, the capacity of MDS-TPIR changes — it increases from 6/11 to 4/7.
The converse for rate 4/7 is trivial, because the rate can not be higher than that of MDS-PIR
with (K,N,Kc) = (2, 4, 3), where privacy needs to be ensured only to each individual server. From
[5], we know that the capacity of MDS-PIR with (K,N,Kc) = (2, 4, 3) is 4/7. Therefore, the upper
bound follows.
Next, we consider the achievable scheme. Each message consists of 12 symbols. The storage
code is specified as follows.
Wkn ∈ F
4×1
p , k ∈ [1 : 2], n ∈ [1 : 4] (253)
Wk = (Wk1;Wk2;Wk3) ∈ F
12×1
p (254)
Wk4 =Wk1 +Wk2 +Wk3 (255)
The query to each server Q
[k]
n is comprised of vectors in Vn and Un, given as follows.
V1 = {V1, V3, V5}, U1 = {U0, U1, U2} (256)
V2 = {V1, V3, V5}, U2 = {U0, U1, U2} (257)
V3 = {V2, V4, V6}, U3 = {U0, U1, U2} (258)
V4 = {V2, V4, V6}, U4 = {U0, U1, U2} (259)
where S = (V1;V2;V3;V4;V5;V6) and S
′ = (U0;U1;U2;U3;U4;U5) are independent and uniform
from the set of all full rank 6× 6 matrices. The rate achieved is 12/(12 + 9) = 4/7 because the 12
desired symbols along the Vi vectors are all independent and the 12 undesired symbols occupy only
10This is because storage is fully replicated, so that each disjoint set of T colluding servers may be equivalently
replaced with 1 server.
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9 dimensions (the symbols along each Ui, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, occupy only Kc = 3 dimensions). Privacy
follows from the observation that for either colluding set {1, 2} or {3, 4}, the vectors in V and U
are both the same. The remaining details can be filled in based on Section 3 and Section 7.2 and
are omitted.
In light of the two contrasting observations, the tightness of the 8/13 upper bound, as well as
the general impact of restricted colluding sets on the capacity of MDS-TPIR remain intriguing open
problems for future work. For readers interested in the latter problem, we conclude this section
with two simple examples of such capacity characterizations.
7.5.3 Examples of Capacity of MDS-TPIR under Restricted Colluding Sets
As usual in this section, we will omit details of achievability arguments that follow directly from
Section 3 and Section 7.2.
Example 1 Consider the setting (K,N,Kc) = (2, 4, 2) and let the restricted colluding sets be
{1, 2}, {3, 4}. Alternatively, let the restricted colluding sets be {1, 2}, {3}, {4}. In either case, the
capacity is 2/3, same as that of MDS-PIR with (K,N,Kc) = (2, 4, 2) [5] so that the converse is
implied. The scheme that achieves rate 4/6 = 2/3 is as follows.
Wkn ∈ F
2×1
p , k ∈ [1 : 2], n ∈ [1 : 4] (260)
Wk = (Wk1;Wk2) ∈ F
4×1
p (261)
Wk3 =Wk1 +Wk2,Wk4 =Wk1 + 2Wk2 (262)
V1 = {V1},U1 = {U0} (263)
V2 = {V1},U2 = {U0} (264)
V3 = {V2},U3 = {U0} (265)
V4 = {V2},U4 = {U0} (266)
where S = (V1;V2) and S
′ = (U0;U1) are independently and uniformly chosen from the set of all
full rank 2× 2 matrices.
Example 2 Suppose (K,N,Kc) = (2, 3, 2) and the colluding sets are either {1, 2}, {2, 3}. Alter-
natively, suppose the colluding sets are {1, 2}, {3}. In both cases, the capacity is 4/7. The scheme
that achieves rate 4/7 is as follows.
Wkn ∈ F
2×1
p , k ∈ [1 : 2], n ∈ [1 : 3] (267)
Wk = (Wk1;Wk2) ∈ F
4×1
p (268)
Wk3 =Wk1 +Wk2 (269)
V1 = {V1},U1 = {U0} (270)
V2 = {V1, V2},U2 = {U0, U1} (271)
V3 = {V2},U3 = {U0} (272)
where S = (V1;V2) and S
′ = (U0;U1) are independent and uniformly chosen from the set of all full
rank 2× 2 matrices over Fp.
For the converse, consider (238). Plugging in K = 2,Kc = 2,N = {3}, N = 3, we have
D ≥ H(A
[1]
1:3|F ,G) ≥ L+H(A
[2]
3 |W1,F ,G) + L/2 + o(L)L (273)
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Note that (238) still holds when |N | = Kc. Plugging in K = 2,Kc = 2,N = {1, 2}, N = 3, we have
D ≥ H(A
[1]
1:3|F ,G) ≥ L+H(A
[2]
1 |W1,F ,G) +H(A
[2]
2 |W1,F ,G) + o(L)L (274)
Adding the two inequalities above, we have
2D ≥ 5L/2 +H(A
[2]
1 , A
[2]
2 , A
[2]
3 |W1,F ,G) + L/2 + o(L)L (275)
(16)
≥ 5L/2 +H(W2|W1,F ,G) + L/2 + o(L)L (276)
(10)(6)
= 7L/2 + o(L)L (277)
Normalizing by L and taking limits as L approaches infinity, gives us the upper bound on the rate
L/D as 4/7, which completes the converse.
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